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Introduction
My PhD thesis consists of three independent essays: one on extensions
to the carry trade and two on stock momentum. As independent essays
they do not share much in common, but there is an underlying theme:
nancial market anomalies. In general anomalies are interesting because
they should not exist. As such they are of obvious relevance in any
scientic eld.
In the case of nancial markets, returns should be a reward for risk.
Otherwise there would be no investors willing to bear those risks. But
some strategies seem to o¤er returns with only elusive relations with
fundamental sources of risk.
For example, the carry trade borrows from low interest rate curren-
cies to invest in high yielding ones. Standard macroeconomics manuals
explain that interest rate di¤erentials should forecast o¤setting move-
ments in currencies. Empirically that is not the case. Hence the returns
of the carry trade seem anomalous.
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Investment strategies exploiting the information in past returns should
not produce abnormal prots either. That seems to violate weak-form
market e¢ ciency. But exploiting past information in returns is exactly
what momentum does.
Of course, what seems anomalous is not necessarily so. The returns
of carry or stock momentum can be rewards for running some misun-
derstood set of risks.
For instance, both the carry trade and stock momentum exhibit large
crash risk. These strategies can be characterized as picking up pennies
in front of a steamroller. A recurrent theme in my thesis is whether the
threat of the steamroller explains the persistency of these anomalies.
My rst essay is on the carry trade. It is a coauthored chapter with
my supervisor, Pedro Santa-Clara. Most research on the carry trade
focuses on that strategy alone, improving the understanding of both its
risk and returns.
The intuition behind our approach is that there is no obvious rea-
son investors in currencies should restrict themselves to carry strategies.
There is pervasive evidence of value and momentum e¤ects across asset
classes and we test its relevance in currency investments. It turns out
that these contribute a lot to portfolio performance.
The resulting optimal portfolio outperforms the carry trade and
2
other naive benchmarks in out-of-sample tests. Its returns are not ex-
plained by risk and are valuable to diversied investors holding stocks
and bonds. One important result is that crash-risk is a poor explana-
tion for these returns. A currency speculator can combine the carry
with other approaches, obtaining less crash risk. Most notably, a port-
folio combining stocks and bonds with diversied currency investments
has less crash risk than one without currencies.
The second essay is on the time-varying beta of the momentum strat-
egy. Previous research shows some convincing evidence that the beta of
momentum changes over time. It was puzzling to me why this previ-
ous research did not estimate the betas the most straightforward way:
bottom-up from the betas of individual stocks in the portfolio. I do just
that and nd the unconditional beta of momentum is highly mislead-
ing. The bottom-up beta of momentum, estimated from the betas of
individual stocks, varies substantially over time. Using bottom-up betas
explains up to 40% of the risk of momentum, out-of-sample. This is
17 times more than one unconditional model achieves and outperforms
other measures of time-varying beta. But like previous research, I nd
that hedging in real time the time-varying systematic risk of momentum
does not avoid its crashes.
The third essay is on the time-varying volatility of momentum. As
3
the rst essay, this is a coauthored chapter with my supervisor. In a rst
step we wanted to assess if an investor with reasonable risk aversion nds
momentum attractive in spite of its rare but intense crashes. We found
the answer to be negative. But then we noticed the crashes of momentum
are not at all like those in the overall stock market. Momentum risk is
quite predictable. The major source of predictability does not come from
systematic risk but from momentum-specic risk. Managing this time-
varying risk virtually eliminates crashes and nearly doubles the Sharpe
ratio of the strategy. We argue that momentum per se is not a very
interesting strategy. It provides long runs of attractive returns. But it
has also produced sudden crashes that took 30 years or more to recover
from. By contrast, risk-managed momentum is more of a puzzle.
Overall, the results of my research do not support the steamroller
hypothesis, either for the carry or the stock momentum strategy.
The carry trade crashes. But in a mean-variance world we know risk
is not about variance but rather about covariance. Similarly, in a world
of fat tails and crashes, risk should not be about the crashes per se but
rather about co-crashes. As a matter of fact the carry does not crash
simultaneously with value and momentum. Quite the opposite.
In the case of stock momentum, the steamroller does speed up some
times, but it seems to honk in advance.
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Chapter 1
Beyond the Carry Trade:
Optimal Currency
Portfolios0
1.1 Introduction
Currency spot rates are nearly unpredictable out of sample (Meese and
Rogo¤ (1983)).1 Usually, unpredictability is seen as evidence supporting
market e¢ ciency, but with currency spot rates it is quite the opposite it
presents a challenge. Since currencies have di¤erent interest rates, if the
di¤erence in interest rates does not forecast an o¤setting depreciation,
then investors can borrow the low yielding currencies to invest in the high
0We thank Andreas Schrimpf, Adrien Verdelhan, Geert Bekaert, Hanno Lustig,
Harald Hau, Maik Schmeling and Nick Roussanov as well as seminar participants at
NOVA, the 2011 QED meeting, the 2012 European Winter Finance Summit in Davos,
the 2012 INFER annual meeting, and three anonymous referees for their helpful
comments and suggestions. We also thank Craig Burnside and Matti Suominen for
letting us use their data.
1See also Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual (2005), Rogo¤ and Stavrakeva (2008), Ro-
go¤ (2009).
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yielding ones (Fama (1984)). This strategy, known as the carry trade,
has performed extremely well and for a long period without any sensible
economic explanation. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2008) show
that a well-diversied carry trade attains a Sharpe ratio that is more
than double that of the US stock market itself a famous puzzle (Mehra
and Prescott (1985)).
Considerable e¤ort has been devoted to explaining the returns of the
carry trade as compensation for risk. Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan
(2011a) show that the risk of carry trades across currency pairs is not
completely diversiable, so there is a systematic risk component. They
form an empirically motivated risk factor the return of high-yielding
currencies minus low-yielding currencies (HMLFX) close in spirit to
the stock market factors of Fama and French (1992) and show that
it explains the carry premium. But the HMLFX is itself a currency
strategy, so linking its returns to more fundamental risk sources is an
important challenge for research in the currency market.
Some risks of the carry trade are well known. High yielding cur-
rencies are known to go up by the stairs and down by the elevator,
implying that the carry trade has substantial crash risk. Carry performs
worse when there are liquidity squeezes (Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Ped-
erson (2008)) and increases in foreign exchange volatility (Menkho¤,
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Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2011a)). Its risk exposures are also
time-varying, increasing in times of greater uncertainty (Christiansen,
Ranaldo, and Söderllind (2010)).
Another possible explanation of the carry premium is that there is
some peso problem with the carry trade  the negative event that
justies its returns may simply have not occurred yet.2 Using options
to hedge away the peso riskreduces abnormal returns, lending some
support to this view, but the remaining returns depend crucially on the
option strategy used for hedging (Jurek (2009)).
Despite our improved understanding of the risk of the carry trade,
the fact remains that conventional risk factors from the stock market
(market, value, size, momentum) or consumption growth models, do not
explain its returns.3 Indeed, an investor looking for signicant abnormal
returns with respect to, say, the Fama-French factors (1992), would do
very well by just dropping all equities from the portfolio and investing
entirely in a passively managed currency carry portfolio instead.
But there is more to the currency market than just the carry trade.
Market practitioners follow other strategies, including value and mo-
mentum (Levich and Pojarliev (2011)). The benets of combining these
2Barro (2006), Fahri and Gabaix (2007), Gourio, Siemer, and Verdelhan (2011),
Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2011).
3Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), Jordà and Taylor (2011).
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di¤erent approaches became apparent during the height of the nancial
crisis when events in the currency market assumed historical propor-
tions.4 Figure 1.1 shows the performance of three popular Deutsche
Bank ETFs that track these strategies with the currencies of the G10.
From August 2008 to January 2009, the carry ETF experienced a severe
crash of 32.6%, alongside the stock market, commodities and high yield
bonds. Even so, this crash was not the peso eventneeded to rational-
ize its previous returns.5 But in the same period, the momentum ETF
delivered a 29.4% return and the value ETF a 17.8% return. So while
the carry trade crashed, a diversied currency strategy fared quite well
in this turbulent period.
Coincidently, the literature on alternative currency investments saw
major developments since 2008. Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf
(2011b) document the properties of currency momentum, Burnside (2011)
examines a combination of carry and momentum, Asness, Moskowitz,
and Pederson (2009) study a combination of value and momentum in
currencies (and other asset classes), and Jordà and Taylor (2009) com-
bine carry, momentum and the real exchange rate.
Most of the studies on alternative currency strategies focus on simple,
4Melvin and Taylor (2009) provide a vivid narrative of the major events in the
currency market during the crisis.
5Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2011).
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equal-weighted portfolios. The choice of simple portfolios is understand-
able as there is substantial evidence indicating these typically outper-
form out-of-sample more complex optimized portfolios.6 However, we
nd that using the historical data up to 2007, an investor would have no
reason to want to equal-weight momentum, value and carry. Optimized
portfolios are a closer reection of the uncertainties faced by investors
in real time. Namely, they have to deal with the choice of what signals
to use, how to weigh each signal, and how to address measurement error
and transaction costs.
To study the risk and return of currency strategies in a more realistic
setting, we use the parametric portfolio policies approach of Brandt,
Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2009) and test the relevance of di¤erent
variables in forming currency portfolios.
First, we use a pre-sample test to study which characteristics mat-
ter for investment purposes. We test the relevance of the interest rate
spread (and its sign), momentum and three proxies for value: reversal,
the real exchange rate, and the current account. Including all charac-
teristics simultaneously in the test, allows us to see which are relevant
and which are subsumed by others. Then we conduct a comprehensive
out-of-sample (OOS) exercise with 16 years of monthly returns. This
6DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009), Jacobs, Müller, and Weber (2010).
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aims to minimize forward-looking bias though it does not eliminate it
completely.7
We nd that the interest rate spread, momentum and reversal cre-
ate economic value for investors whereas fundamentals as the current
account and the real exchange rate dont. The strategy combining the
relevant signals increases the Sharpe ratio relative to an equal-weighted
carry portfolio from 0.57 to 0.86, out-of-sample and after transaction
costs. This is a 0.29 gain, about the same as the Sharpe ratio of the
stock market in the same period.
Transaction costs matter in currency markets. Taking transaction
costs into account in the optimization further increases the Sharpe ratio
to 1.06, a total gain of 0.49 over the equal-weighted carry benchmark.
The gains in certainty equivalent are even more expressive as the optimal
diversied strategy substantially reduces crash risk.
Unlike the typical result in OOS tests of optimized equity portfolios,
we nd that the optimized portfolio outperforms all naive benchmarks.8
Also, the risk factors recently proposed to explain carry returns do not
explain the returns of the optimized portfolio, which has monthly s
7After all, would we be conducting the same out-of-sample exercise in the rst
place if there were no indications in the literature that momentum and value worked
in recent years? Still, unlike naive portfolios, our strategy will not invest in these
signals more than justied by the historical data up to each moment in time.
8Brandt, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2009) optimized portfolio of stocks also out-
performs OOS naive benchmarks.
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ranging between 1.73 and 2.38 percent. So, while these risk factors may
have some success explaining carry returns, they struggle to make sense
of our optimal currency strategy.
We assess the benets of diversication across currency investment
strategies for investors already exposed to other asset classes. We nd
an average increase in the Sharpe ratio of 0.51, a much more impressive
gain than the one documented in Kroencke, Schindler, and Schrimpf
(2011). Furthermore, including the currency strategies in the portfolio
consistently reduces fat tails and left skewness. This contradicts crash-
risk explanations for returns in the currency market.
Finally, we regress the returns of the optimal strategy on the level of
speculative capital in the market, following Jylhä and Suominen (2011).
We nd evidence that the returns of the strategy decline as the amount
of hedge fund capital increases. This suggests that the returns we docu-
ment constitute an anomaly that is gradually being arbitraged away by
hedge funds.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 1.2 we explain
the implementation of parametric portfolios of currencies. Section 1.3
presents the empirical analysis. Section 1.3.1 describes the data and the
variables used in the optimization. Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 present the
investment performance of the optimal portfolios in and out of sample,
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respectively. Section 1.4 compares the performance of the optimal port-
folio with naive benchmarks. In Section 1.5 we test the risk exposures
of the optimal portfolio. In Section 1.6 we assess the value of currency
strategies for investors holding stocks and bonds. Section 1.7 discusses
possible explanations for the abnormal returns of the strategy, including
insu¢ cient speculative capital early in the sample.
1.2 Optimal parametric portfolios of currencies
We optimize currency portfolios from the perspective of an US investor
in the forward exchange market. In the forward exchange market,
the investor can agree at time t to buy currency i at time t + 1 for
1=F it;t+1 where F
i
t;t+1 is the price of one USD expressed in foreign cur-
rency units (FCU). Then at time t+1 the investor liquidates the position
selling the currency for 1/Sit+1; where S
i
t+1 is the spot price of one USD
in FCU. The return (in US dollars) of a long position in currency i in
month t is:
rit+1 =
F it;t+1
Sit+1
  1 (1.1)
This is a zero-investment strategy as it consists of positions in the
forward market only.9 We use one-month forwards throughout as is
9 In reality investors need to post collateral to take positions in forward markets.
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standard in the literature.10 Therefore all returns are monthly and there
are no inherited positions from month to month. This also avoids path-
dependency when we include transaction costs in the analysis.
We optimize the currency strategies using the parametric portfolio
policies approach of Brandt, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2009). This
method models the weights of assets as a function of their characteristics.
The implicit assumption is that the characteristics convey all relevant
information about the assetsconditional distribution of returns. The
weight on currency i at time t is:
wi;t = 
Txi;t=Nt (1.2)
where xi;t is a k  1 vector of currency characteristics,  is a k 
1 parameter vector to be estimated and Nt is the number of curren-
cies available in the dataset at time t. Dividing by Nt keeps the policy
stationary (see Brandt, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2009)). We do not
place any restriction on the weights, which can be positive or negative.
This reects the fact that in the forward exchange market there is no
obvious non-negativity constraint.
The strategies we examine consist of an investment of 100% in the
We ignore that in this study.
10Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2008), Burnside (2011), Burnside, Eichen-
baum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2011), Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf
(2011a,b).
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US risk-free asset, yielding rfUSt ; and a long-short portfolio in the for-
ward exchange market. For a given sample,  uniquely determines a
parametric portfolio policy, and the corresponding return each period
will be:
rp;t+1 = rf
US
t +
NtX
i=1
wi;tr
i
t+1 (1.3)
The problem an investor faces is optimizing its objective function
picking the best possible  for the sample:
max

Et [U(rp;t+1)] (1.4)
We use power utility as the objective function:
U(rp) =
(1 + rp)
1 
1   (1.5)
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (CRRA).11 The main
advantage of this utility function is that it penalizes kurtosis and skew-
ness, as opposed to mean-variance utility, which focuses only on the rst
two moments of the distribution of returns. So our investor dislikes crash
risk and values characteristics that help reduce it, even if these do not
11Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) estimate  empirically from risk-aversion implicit
in one-month options on the S&P and the FTSE and nd a value very close to 4. We
adopt this value and keep it throughout. The most important measures of economic
performance of the strategy are scale-invariant (Sharpe ratio, skewness, kurtosis), so
the specic choice of CRRA utility is not of crucial importance.
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add to the Sharpe ratio.
The main restriction imposed on the investors problem is that  is
kept constant across time. This substantially reduces the chances for in-
sample overtting as only a k 1 vector of characteristics is estimated.
The assumption that  does not change allows its estimation using the
sample counterparts:
̂ = argmax

1
T
T 1X
t=0
U
 
rfUSt +
NtX
i=1
(Txi;t=Nt)r
i
t+1
!
(1.6)
For statistical inference purposes, Brandt, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov
(2009) show that we can use either the asymptotic covariance matrix of
̂ or bootstrap methods.12
For the interpretation of results it is important to note that (1.6)
optimizes a utility function and not a measure of the distance between
forecasted and realized returns. Therefore,  can be found relevant for
one characteristic even if it conveys no information at all about expected
returns. The characteristic may just be a predictor of a currencys con-
tribution to the overall skewness or kurtosis of the portfolio, for example.
Conversely, a characteristic may be found irrelevant for investment pur-
poses even if it does help in forecasting returns. Indeed, it may forecast
12We use bootstrap methods for standard errors in the empirical part of this paper,
as these are slightly more conservative and do not rely on asymptotic results.
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both higher returns and higher risk for a currency, o¤ering a trade-o¤
that is irrelevant for the investors utility function.
Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2011b) show that mo-
mentum strategies incur higher transaction costs than the carry trade.
They even nd that momentum prots are of little relevance in curren-
cies of developed countries after transaction costs. So one valid concern
is whether the gains of combining momentum with carry persist after
taking into consideration time and cross-currency variation in transac-
tion costs. Fortunately, parametric portfolio policies can easily incorpo-
rate transaction costs that vary across currencies and over time. This is
a particularly appealing feature of the method, since transaction costs
varied substantially as foreign exchange trading shifted towards elec-
tronic crossing networks.
To address this issue we optimize:
̂ = argmax

1
T
T 1X
t=0
U
 
rfUSt +
NtX
i=1
(Txi;t=Nt)r
i
t+1  
NtX
i=1
Txi;t=Nt ci;t!
(1.7)
where ci;t is the transaction cost of currency i at time t; which we cal-
culate as:
ci;t =
F askt;t+1   F bidt;t+1
F askt;t+1 + F
bid
t;t+1
(1.8)
This is one half of the bid-ask spread as a percentage of the mid-quote.
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This assumes the investor buys (sells) a currency in the forward market
at the ask (bid) price, and the forward is settled at the next months
spot rate. This may overstate transaction costs. For instance, Mancini,
Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2011) document that e¤ective costs in the
spot market are less than half those implied by bid-ask quotes as there
is signicant within-quote trading.
There is another important point to highlight about transaction
costs: for a given month and currency, these are proportional to the
absolute weight put on that particular currency. This absolute weight is
a function of all the currency characteristics as seen in equation 1.2, so
transaction costs will depend crucially on the time-varying interaction
between characteristics. One example is the interaction between momen-
tum and other characteristics. As Grundy and Martin (2001) show for
stocks, the way momentum portfolios are built guarantees time-varying
interaction with other stock characteristics. For instance, after a bear
market, winners tend to be low-beta stocks and the reverse for losers. So
the momentum portfolio, long in previous winners and short in previous
losers, will have a negative beta. The opposite holds after a bull market.
The same applies for currencies, after a period where carry experienced
high returns, high yielding currencies tend to have positive momentum.
In this case, momentum reinforces the carry signal and results in larger
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absolute weights and thus higher transaction costs. However, after neg-
ative carry returns the opposite happens: high yielding currencies have
negative momentum. So momentum partially o¤sets the carry signal
resulting in smaller absolute weights and actually reduces the overall
transaction costs of the portfolio. This means the transaction costs of
including momentum for an extended period of time in a diversied
portfolio policy will be lower than what one nds examining momentum
in isolation as in Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2011b).
1.3 Empirical analysis
As gure 1.1 shows, combining reversal and momentum with the carry
trade considerably mitigated the crash of the carry trade in the last
quarter of 2008. Yet this is easy to point out ex post. The relevant
question is whether investors in the currency market had reasons to
believe in the virtue of diversifying their investment strategy before the
2008 crash. For example, Levich and Pojarliev (2011) examine a sample
of currency managers and nd that they explored carry, momentum
and value strategies before the crisis but shifted substantially across
investment styles over time. In particular, right before the height of
the nancial crisis in the last quarter of 2008, most currency managers
were heavily exposed to the carry trade, neutral on momentum and
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investing against value. This raises the question of whether the benets
of diversication were as clear before the crisis as they later became
apparent. Equally weighting carry, momentum, and value was not an
obvious strategy at the time. This also shows that what appear to be
naively simple strategies such as equal weighting carry, momentum, and
value are not naive at all and in fact benet a lot from hindsight.
To address this issue we conduct two tests: i) a pre-sample test with
the rst 20 years of data up to 1996 to determine which characteristics
were relevant back then; ii) an out-of-sample experiment since 1996 in
which the investor chooses the weight to put on each signal using only
historical information available up to each moment in time.
Section 1.3.1. explains the data sources and the variables used in our
optimization. In section 1.3.2. we conduct the pre-sample test with the
sample from 1976:02 to 1996:02. In section 1.3.3. we conduct the out-
of-sample experiment of portfolio optimization using only the relevant
variables identied in the pre-sample test.
1.3.1 Data
We use data on exchange rates, the forward discount / premium, and
the real exchange rate for the Euro zone and 27 member countries of the
Organization for Cooperation and Development (OECD). The countries
in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Re-
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public, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Por-
tugal, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and
the US.
The exchange rate data are from Datastream. They include spot
exchange rates at monthly frequency from November 1960 to December
2011 and one-month forward exchange rates from February 1976. As in
Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2011) we merge two
datasets of forward exchange rates (against the USD and the GBP) to
have a comprehensive sample of returns in the forward market in the
oating exchange rate era.13
We calculate the real exchange rates of each currency against the
USD using the spot exchange rates and the consumer price index. The
Consumer Price Index (CPI) data come from the OECD/Main Economic
Indicators (MEI) online database. For the Euro, the series that starts
January 1996 was extended back to January 1988 using the weights of
the Euro founding members. In the case of Australia, New Zealand, and
Ireland (before November 1975) only quarterly data are available. In
those cases, the value of the last available period was carried forward to
13The rst dataset has data on forward exchange rates (bid and ask quotes) against
the GBP from 1976 to 1996 and the second dataset has the same information for
quotes against the USD from 1996 to 2011.
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the next month.
We test the economic relevance of carry, momentum, and value prox-
ies combined in a currency market investment strategy. The variables
used in the optimization exercise are:
1. signi;t: The sign of the forward discount of a currency with respect
to the USD. It is 1 if the foreign currency is trading at a discount
(Fi;t > Si;t) and -1 if it trades at a premium. This is the carry trade
strategy examined in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2008),
Burnside (2011), Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo
(2011). Given the extensive study of this strategy we adopt it as
the benchmark throughout the analysis.
2. fdi;t: The interest rate spread or the forward discount on the cur-
rency. We standardize the forward discount using the cross-section
mean and standard deviation across all countries available at time
t, FDt and FDt respectively. Specically, denoting the (unstan-
dardized) forward discount as FDi;t; we obtain the standardized
discount as: fdi;t =
FDi;t FDt
FDt
: This cross-sectional standardiza-
tion measures the forward discount in standard deviations above or
below the average across all countries. By construction, a variable
standardized in the cross-section will have zero mean, implying
that the strategy is neutral in terms of the base currency (the US
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dollar). Jurek (2009) shows that an interest rate spread strategy
similar to this outperforms the equally-weighted carry trade based
on sign.
3. momi;t: For currency momentum we use the cumulative currency
appreciation in the last three-month period, cross-sectionally stan-
dardized. This variable explores the short-term persistence in cur-
rency returns. We use momentum in the previous three months
because there is ample evidence for persistence in returns for port-
folios with this formation period while there are no signicant gains
(in fact the momentum e¤ect is often smaller) considering longer
formation periods (see Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf
(2011b)). Three-month momentum was also used in Kroencke,
Schindler, and Schrimpf (2011). Cross-sectional standardizations
means that momentum measures relative performance. Even if all
currencies fall relative to the USD those that fall less will have
positive momentum.
4. revi;t: Long-term reversal is the cumulative real currency depre-
ciation in the previous ve years, standardized cross-sectionally.
First we calculate the cumulative real depreciation of currency
i between the basis period (h) and moment t as an index num-
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ber Qi;h;t =
Si;tCPIi;h 2CPIUSt 2
Si;hCPIi;t 2CPIUSh 2
: We use a two-month lag to ensure
the CPI is known. We pick h = t   60 which corresponds to 5
years: Then we standardize Qi;h;t cross-sectionally to obtain revi;t:
This is essentially the same as the notion of currency valueused
in Asness, Moskowitz, and Pederson (2009). We just use the cu-
mulative deviation from purchasing power parity, instead of the
cumulative return as they did, to obtain a longer out-of-sample
test period. Reversal is positive for those currencies that experi-
enced the larger real depreciations against the USD in the previous
5 years and negative for the others.
5. qi;t: The real exchange rate standardized by its historical mean
and standard deviation. First, as for reversal, we computeQi;hi;t with
the di¤erence that here the basis period (hi) is the rst month for
which there is CPI and exchange rate data available for currency
i. Then we compute qi;t =
Qi;hi;t Qi;t
Qi;t
; where Qi;t is the historical
average
tP
j=hi
Qi;hi;j=t and Qi;t is the historical standard deviation


fQi;hi;jgtj=hi

: The real exchange rate is measured in standard
deviations above or below the historical average. Jordà and Taylor
(2009) also used the demeaned real exchange rate but our time se-
ries standardization ensures only information available up to each
moment in time is used. Unlike rev ; which is cross-sectionally
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standardized, q is not neutral in terms of the basis currency (the
USD). It will tend to be positive for all currencies when these are
undervalued against the USD by historical standards.
6. cai;t: The current account of the foreign economy as a percentage
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), standardized cross-sectionally.
The optimization assumes that the previous year current account
information becomes known in April of the current year. The cur-
rent account data were retrieved from the Annual Macroeconomic
database of the European Commission (AMECO), where data are
available on a yearly frequency from 1960 onward. Many studies
examine the relation between the current account and exchange
rates justifying its inclusion as a conditional variable.14
In order to be considered for the trading strategies, a currency must
satisfy three criteria: i) there must be ten previous years of real ex-
change rate data; ii) current forward and spot exchange quotes must be
available; and iii) the country must be an OECD member in the period
considered. After ltering out missing observations, there are a mini-
mum of 13 and a maximum of 21 currencies in the sample. On average
there are 16 currencies in the sample.
14See, for example, Dornbusch and Fischer (1980), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2005),
Gourinchas and Rey (2007).
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1.3.2 Pre-sample results
Table 1.1 shows the investment performance of the optimized strategies
from 1976:02 to 1996:02. We use this pre-sample period to check which
variables had strong enough evidence supporting their relevance back in
1996, before starting the out-of-sample experiment.
The two versions of the carry trade (sign and fd) deliver similar
performance, with high Sharpe ratios (0.96 and 0.99, respectively) but
also with signicant crash risk (as captured by excess kurtosis and left-
skewness). Momentum provides a Sharpe ratio of 0.56, better than
the performance of the stock market of 0.40 in the same sample. This
conrms the results of Okunev and White (2003), Burnside, Eichen-
baum and Rebelo (2011), and Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf
(2011b).
Financial predictors work better in our optimization than fundamen-
tals like the real exchange rate and the current account. Reversal had an
interesting Sharpe ratio of 0.36. This conrms the results of Menkho¤,
Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2011b) and Asness, Moskowitz, and
Pederson (2009). The strategies using the current account and the real
exchange rate as conditioning variables achieved modest Sharpe ratios
(of 0.16 and 0.07), not at all impressive  especially as this is an in-
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sample optimization.15
The seventh row shows the performance of an optimal strategy com-
bining the carry (both sign and fd) with momentum and reversal 
all the statistically relevant variables. Already in 1996 there was ample
evidence indicating that a strategy combining di¤erent variables lead to
substantial gains. The Sharpe ratio of the optimal strategy was nearly
40% higher than the benchmark and it produced a 16.43 percentage
points gain in annual certainty equivalent.
Adding fundamentals to this strategy does not improve it: the Sharpe
ratio increases only 0.01 and the annual certainty equivalent only 13 ba-
sis points. An insignicant gain since in-sample any additional variable
must always increase utility.
Table 1.2 shows the statistical signicance of the variables, isolated
and in combination. The table presents the point-estimates of the co-
e¢ cients and the bootstrapped p-values (in brackets). We perform the
bootstrap by generating 1,000 random samples drawn with replacement
from the original sample and with the same number of observations (240
months of returns and respective conditional variables). Then we nd
the optimal coe¢ cients in each random sample, thereby obtaining their
15We also tested these variables out-of-sample (although, based on the in-sample
evidence, the investor would choose not to consider them) and found that they did
not add to the economic value of the strategy.
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distribution across samples.
Taken in isolation, the carry trade variables (sign and fd) and mo-
mentum are all signicant at the 1% level. Reversal has a p-value of
5.3%.
The current account and the real exchange rate have the wrong sign
(underweighting undervalued currencies and those with strong current
accounts) but are not signicant. We have known since Meese and Rogo¤
(1983), currency spot rates are nearly unpredictable by fundamentals.
Using time-series methods, Gourinchas and Rey (2007) nd that the
current account forecasts the spot exchange rate of the US dollar against
a basket of currencies.16 But we nd no evidence in the cross section
that the current account is relevant for designing a protable portfolio
of currencies. At best, the fundamental information is subsumed by
interest rates, momentum and reversal.
Combining all variables conrms our main result. Carry, momentum
and reversal are relevant for the optimization, fundamentals are not.
The nal row shows the results for an optimization using only the vari-
ables deemed relevant. The p-values show the four variables contribute
signicantly to the economic value of the strategy in combination.
Concerning both carry variables (sign and fd), the correlation of
16Gourinchas and Rey (2007) derive their result making a di¤erent use of the current
account information. Namely, they detrend it and also consider net foreign wealth.
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their returns was 0.46 from 1976:02 to 1996:02, a value that has not
changed much since. So these two ways of implementing the carry trade
are not identical and the investor nds it optimal to use both. The
sign variable assigns the same weight to a currency yielding 0.1% more
than the USD as to another yielding 5% more. In contrast, the fd
variable assigns weights proportionally to the magnitude of the interest
rate di¤erential. Whenever the USD interest rate is close to the extremes
of cross section, the sign is very exposed to variations in its value, while
fd is always dollar-neutral.
One word of caution on forward-looking bias is needed here. Our
in-sample test shows that in 1996 some of the strategies recently pro-
posed in the literature on currency returns would already be found to
have an interesting performance. This is a necessary condition to assess
if investors would want to use these variables in real time to build diver-
sied currency portfolios. However, this does not tell us whether there
were other investment approaches that would have seemed relevant in
1996 and resulted afterwards in poor economic performance.
1.3.3 Out-of-sample results
We perform an out-of-sample (OOS) experiment to test the robustness of
the optimal portfolio combining carry, momentum, and value strategies.
The rst optimal parametric portfolio is estimated using the initial 240
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months of the sample. Then the model is re-estimated every month,
using an expanding window of data, until the end of the sample. The
out-of-sample returns thus obtained minimize the problem of look-ahead
bias. We do not use q and ca in the optimization as these failed to pass
the in-sample test with data until 1996.17
The in-sample results also hold out of sample. Table 1.3 shows that
the model using interest rate variables, momentum and reversal achieves
a certainty equivalent gain of 10.84 percent over the benchmark, with
better kurtosis and skewness. Its Sharpe ratio is 1.15, a gain of 0.45 over
the benchmark sign portfolio.
Transaction costs can considerably hamper the performance of an
investment strategy. For example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) pro-
vide compelling evidence that there is momentum in stock prices, but
Lesmond et al. (2004) nd that after taking transaction costs into con-
sideration there are little to no gains to be obtained in exploiting mo-
mentum.
Panel B of table 1.3 shows the OOS performance of the strategies
after taking transaction costs into consideration. Clearly transaction
costs matter. The Sharpe ratio of the optimal strategy is reduced by
0.29, a magnitude similar to the equity premium, and the certainty
17Although including these does not change much the results as they receive little
weight in the optimization.
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equivalent drops from 18.87 percent to just 12.15 percent. Momentum
and reversal individually show no protability at all after transaction
costs. This nding mirrors the results of Lesmond et al. (2004) with
regard to stock momentum. It also conrms the result in Menkho¤,
Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2011b) that there are no signicant
momentum prots in currencies of developed countries after transaction
costs.
But we nd that transaction costs can be managed. In panel C
we adjust the optimization to currency and time-specic transaction
costs. We calculate the cost-adjusted interest rate spread variable as:
gFDi;t = sign(FDit)(jFDitj   cit) and standardize it in the cross-section
to get ffdit. We then model the parametric weight function as:
wi;t = I(cit < jFDitj)

Txi;t=Nt

(1.9)
where I(:) is the indicator function, with a value of one if the condition
holds and zero otherwise. We maximize expected utility with this new
portfolio policy, estimating  after consideration of transaction costs.
This method e¤ectively eliminates from the sample currencies with
prohibitive transaction costs and reduces the exposure to those that
have a high ratio of cost to forward discount. Other, more complex,
rules might lead to better results, but we refrain from this pursuit as this
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simple approach is enough to prove the point that managing transaction
costs adds considerable value.
The procedure increases the Sharpe ratio of the diversied strategy
from 0.86 to 1.06 and produces a gain in the certainty equivalent of
4.54 percent per year. This gain alone is higher than the momentum
or reversal certainty equivalents per se. Indeed, the performance of the
diversied strategy with managed transaction costs is very close to the
strategy in panel A without transaction costs.
Managing transaction costs is particularly important as these cur-
rency strategies are leveraged. Given the high Sharpe ratios attainable
by investing in currencies, the optimization picks high levels of lever-
age. We dene leverage as Lt =
NtP
i=1
jwitj: This is the absolute value
of US dollars risked in the currency strategy per dollar invested in the
risk-free asset. The optimal strategy has a mean leverage of 5.94 in the
OOS period of 1996:03 to 2011:12. As a result, a small di¤erence in
transaction costs can have a large impact in the economic performance
of the strategy.
One concern in optimized portfolios is whether in-sample overtting
leads to unstable and erratic coe¢ cients OOS. Figure 1.2 shows the
estimated coe¢ cients of the diversied portfolio with managed costs in
the OOS period. The coe¢ cients of the four variables used are very
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stable, leading to consistent exposure to the conditioning variables.
The optimal diversied portfolio has a robust OOS economic per-
formance. In the next section we compare it with simple strategies
proposed in the literature.
1.4 Comparison with naive currency strategies
We want to assess the importance of using our optimization procedure
by comparing our strategy with simple alternatives. This is especially
important because DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) show that
simple rules of investment have robust out-of-sample performance when
compared to optimized portfolios. One could argue though that simple
currency strategies are not so naive. The performance of long-short
portfolios depends on the characteristic used to sort currencies in the rst
place. The choice of characteristics to average is thus crucial. Why carry,
momentum and reversal and not something else? There is the choice of
designing a strategy that is neutral in terms of the basis currency (as
fd) or not (as sign): The weighing of di¤erent currency characteristics
is also arbitrary in a naive strategy. So the scope for arbitrary choices
inuenced by ex post observation of the data is not necessarily small
for naive strategies. Still, the simple strategies found in the literature
provide a natural benchmark for our optimal portfolio policy.
33
We compare the economic performance of the optimal diversied
strategy with 5 simple portfolios: i) the sign strategy, which is long
currencies yielding more than the USD and short the others; ii) the
version of momentum (momb) proposed in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (2011) which is long currencies with a positive return in the
previous month and short the others; iii) an equal-weighted combination
of sign and momentum; iv) the interest rate spread strategy (fd); v) an
equal-weighted portfolio of the signals used in our portfolio policy 
momentum, reversal, sign and fd.
It is questionable whether the EW strategy is a naive approach since
this strategy uses the signals selected by the optimized portfolio. But
including this EW portfolio allows an assessment of how relevant it is to
manage transaction costs and to allow the coe¢ cients in the strategy to
di¤er from equality.
Table 1.4 shows the economic performance of the optimal strategy
compared to the simple alternatives. All strategies include a 100% in-
vestment in the risk free asset complemented with a long-short cur-
rency portfolio. We scale all simple strategies to have constant leverage
throughout the period, set to match the mean leverage of the optimized
strategy. This ensures that di¤erences in performance do not depend on
di¤erences in leverage. Note that the leverage of the portfolio is opti-
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mally chosen indirectly in the maximization of the utility function. The
leverage (Lt =
NtP
i=1
jwitj =
NtP
i=1
jxitj=Nt) depends both on the estimated
coe¢ cients and on the level of the explanatory variables and therefore
changes through time. We also include a version of the optimal strategy
with constant leverage to assess if time-varying leverage is important to
performance.
The optimal strategy, with a Sharpe ratio of 1.06 and a certainty
equivalent of 16.69 percent, outperforms all others. The 0.22 gain in
Sharpe ratio with respect to the EW strategy (the naive approach
that performed the best) is statistically signicant with a p-value of
0.027.18This is because the optimal coe¢ cients are not equal (as seen in
Figure 1.2) and the simple strategy does not manage transaction costs.
The gain in certainty equivalent of 7.13 percentage points is even more
expressive.
Perhaps surprising is the unimpressive performance of the combi-
nation of sign and momb: It achieves a lower Sharpe ratio than the
sign strategy alone. This is because leverage is set to a constant level,
so the outperformance of this strategy documented in Burnside, Eichen-
baum, and Rebelo (2011) comes from time-varying leverage. Whenever
a currency yields more than the USD but experiences a negative return
18Computed with same method as DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009).
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in the previous month, the two signals cancel out resulting in a weight of
zero for the currency. As a result, the combination of sign andmomb has
time-varying leverage, increasing after months when carry has positive
returns and decreasing otherwise.
The optimal strategy with constant leverage has a good performance,
with a Sharpe ratio of 0.99, though not as good as the unconstrained
strategy. Allowing leverage to change over time leads to lower kurtosis
and less negative skewness.
All in all, the evidence on economic performance is clear: the optimal
strategy produces a certainty equivalent gain of 7.13 percentage points
per year over the best performing naive strategy. This gain is due to a
higher Sharpe ratio and lower crash risk (as captured by kurtosis and
left-skewness).
In table 1.5 we regress the excess returns of the optimal strategy on
those of the simple portfolios to assess its abnormal returns, captured by
the intercept. The t-statistics and R-squares are obviously signicant,
since the optimal strategy is built with similar variables as the naive
strategies. But these variables do not fully explain the excess returns
which range from 0.68 to 2.28 percent per month. The optimal strategy
shows an abnormal return of 8.16 percent per year with respect to the
best performing naive strategy.
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Figure 1.3 shows the cumulative excess returns of each naive strategy
compared to the optimal diversied portfolio. We also include the excess
return on the stock market portfolio for comparison. Currency strategies
in general outperform the stock market. The Sharpe ratio of the stock
market in the OOS period is 0.29, lower than any currency strategy
examined.
But the graph also shows that no simple portfolio systematically
outperforms the optimal strategy. This contrasts with the result of
DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) for stocks. This result extends
and conrms recent ndings that optimization methods can outper-
form more naive approaches in currency markets (Corte, Sarno, Tsiakas
(2009), Berge, Jordà, and Taylor ( 2010)).
1.5 Risk exposures
Cochrane (2011) uses the expression factor zooto describe the growing
number of risk factors proposed in the literature to explain asset returns.
The literature on currency markets is no exception and many sets of risk
factors have been proposed, mostly to explain the returns of the carry
trade.
Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011a) propose an empirically-
motivated high-minus-low factor of currencies sorted on interest rates
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(HMLFX) to explain carry trade returns. This is an approach similar
in spirit to the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model for stock
returns. Note however that the HMLFX factor is itself by construc-
tion a carry portfolio. So while this approach establishes that there
is systematic risk in the carry trade, it does not provide intuition on
what is the fundamental risk source that justies its returns. Brunner-
meier, Nagel, and Pederson (2008) argue that liquidity-risk spirals are
the source of risk of the carry trade. They use the innovation in the
TED spread and in the VIX as factors proxying for liquidity and risk.
Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2011a) propose innovations
in foreign exchange market volatility as a risk factor to explain the carry
trade and currency momentum. They also use the innovation in aver-
age transaction costs and argue the information in this is subsumed by
FX volatility. Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) and Lustig, Roussanov, and
Verdelhan (2011b) propose consumption growth risk as a factor to ex-
plain the carry returns. Table 1.6 shows the exposure of the optimal
diversied strategy (with managed transaction costs) to 8 sets of risk
factors.
The rst model shows that the currency strategy is not exposed to
consumption growth risk.19 This conrms the results of Burnside (2011)
19For this we use the monthly growth rate of Real Personal Consumption Expen-
ditures downloaded from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis.
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and Jordà and Taylor (2011).
The second and third models show that our strategy is exposed to liq-
uidity risk (as captured by innovations in the TED spread) and increases
in stock volatility (as captured by the changes in VIX). The VIX is a
more signicant variable, its beta has a t-statistic of -3.98 versus -2.90
for the TED spread.
The fourth model regresses the returns of the optimal strategy on
innovations in transaction costs (the cross-section average in the forward
exchange market). This does not yield signicant results as the adjusted
R-squared is negative.
The fth model shows the diversied portfolio, with a t-statistic of
-2.15, is exposed to innovations in foreign exchange volatility conrming
Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2011a).20 But the adjusted
R-squared is only 1.88, much less than the 7.27 of the VIX.
Our optimal strategy is also somewhat exposed to stock market risk
as the CAPM and the Carhart (1997) models show. But the only rel-
evant variable is the excess return on the market portfolio with a t-
statistic of 4.02 in the CAPM and 4.08 in the Carhart four-factor model.
The best performing model, in term of adjusted R-squared, is the
20We follow Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2011a) in computing FX
volatility in month t as: FX;t = 1Dt
DtP
=1
NP
i=1
jri;j
N
; where Dt is the number of trading
days in month t and N is the number of currencies available in day  :
39
empirically-motivatedHMLFX factor of Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdel-
han (2011a). In this model we regress the optimal portfolio excess
returns on RX (the dollar-return of an equal-weighted average of all
currency portfolios) and HMLFX ; the di¤erence in return between the
highest yielding currencies and the lowest yielding currencies.21 The
beta with respect to the HMLFX is clearly signicant, with a t-stat of
6.54, and the adjusted R-squared of 20.85 is by far the highest among
the eight models used.
But the most striking result is the consistently high  of the opti-
mal strategy, ranging between 1.73 and 2.38 percent per month, always
signicant at conventional levels of condence. So, while the optimal
strategy is exposed to some of the factors proposed in the literature
on currency returns, the R-squared is typically low and the abnormal
returns highly signicant.
There is evidence of time-varying risk exposures in the carry trade
(Christiansen, Ranaldo, and Söderllind (2010)). In particular, the expo-
sure of the carry to the stock market rises after shocks to liquidity and
risk. This is not captured by the unconditional analysis in table 1.6. So
it is of interest to ask whether the optimal strategy also has time-varying
risk.
21We retrieve the data from Adrien Verdelhans webpage. The data is for returns
with all currencies and after transaction costs.
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Following Christiansen, Ranaldo, and Söderllind (2010) we run the
following OLS regression:
rp;t rft = +0RMRFt+1RMRFtzt 1+2Rbonds ;t+3Rbonds ;tzt 1+"t
(1.10)
where zt 1 is a proxy for (lagged) risk and Rbonds ;t is the excess return of
the 10 year US bond over the risk-free rate.22 As proxies for risk we use
the foreign exchange volatility, the TED spread, VIX, the average trans-
action cost, and leverage. The rst four are also used in Christiansen,
Ranaldo, and Söderllind (2010). We add leverage as this is time varying
in the optimal strategy and could naturally induce time-varying risk.
The results of the regression are in table 1.7. The only interaction
term that is signicant is for the TED spread with the market. But the
sign of the coe¢ cient is negative, implying the strategy is less exposed
to the stock market after a liquidity squeeze. In order for time-varying
risk to explain the returns of the diversied strategy, the opposite should
happen. All other interaction terms are not signicant, so time-varying
risk is of little relevance to explain the performance of the diversied
strategy. In particular, there is no evidence that the optimal strategy is
riskier when it is more leveraged. In general, the conditional models do
not add much to the CAPM, and the large signicant  persists after
22Bond returns are from Datastream.
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considering time-varying risk.
Either unconditionally or conditionally the risk factors proposed to
explain the carry trade can do very little to explain the returns of our
optimal diversied currency strategy. This indicates that the optimal
strategy exploits market ine¢ ciencies rather than loading on factor risk
premiums.
1.6 Value to diversied investors
We assess whether the currency strategies are relevant for investors al-
ready exposed to the major asset classes. Indeed, there is no reason a
priori that investors should restrict themselves to pure currency strate-
gies, particularly when there are other risk factors that have consistently
o¤ered signicant premiums as well.
The value of currency strategies to diversied investors holding bonds
and stocks is a relatively unexplored topic. Most of the literature on
the currency market has focused on currency-specic strategies. One
exception is Kroencke, Schindler, and Schrimpf (2011) who nd that
combining investments in stocks and bonds with currencies improves
the Sharpe ratio from 0.34 to 0.43 without entailing an increase in crash
risk.
We continue to assume that the investor optimizes power utility with
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constant relative risk aversion of 4. The returns on wealth are now:
Rp;t+1 = rf
US
t +
MX
j=1
wjFj +
NtX
i=1
wi;tri;t+1  
NtX
i=1
jwi;tj ci;t (1.11)
where wj are the (constant) weights on a set of M investable factors
F expressed as excess returns, and wi;t depends on the characteristics
and the  coe¢ cients that maximize utility jointly with wj .
Table 1.8 shows the OOS performance of the portfolios with and
without the currency strategy. The currency strategy combines the in-
terest rate spread, sign, momentum, and long-term reversal. Subse-
quently, each two rows compare a portfolio of investable factors with a
portfolio combining these factors with the currency strategy.
The opportunity to invest in currencies is clearly valuable to in-
vestors. Including currencies in the portfolio always adds to the Sharpe
ratio and raises the certainty equivalent. The OOS gains in certainty
equivalent range between 9.99 percentage points for an investment in
stocks and bonds and 38.04 percentage points for a diversied invest-
ment using the Carhart factors. The gain with respect to the Carhart
factors comes mainly from the dismal performance of stock momentum
in 2009, when it experienced one of its worst crashes in history (Daniel
and Moskowitz (2011)).
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These gains are far more impressive than the gains from adding fac-
tors like HML and SMB to the stock market. Indeed, only the inclusion
of bonds improves upon the certainty equivalent of the stock market
OOS. Generally, the inclusion of SMB, HML, and WML factors im-
proves Sharpe ratios, but this increase is o¤set by higher drawdowns,
resulting in lower certainty equivalents.
Including currencies however leads to substantial gains. This extends
the evidence in Burnside (2011) that there is no known set of risk factors
that prices currency and stock returns simultaneously. The relevance of
the interest rate spread, currency momentum, and long-term reversal
to forecast currency returns makes all conventional risk premiums seem
small in comparison.
Including currencies in the portfolio of stocks and bonds produces
increases in the Sharpe ratio as high as 0.81 for a portfolio of US stocks
and currencies. On average adding currency strategies increases the
Sharpe ratio by 0.51. This conrms the results of Kroencke, Schindler,
and Schrimpf (2011).
One possible justication for the higher Sharpe ratios obtainable by
investing in currencies is that these might entail a higher crash risk 
as Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008) shows for the carry trade.
But diversied currency strategies do not conform to this explanation.
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Figure 1.4 shows how complementing a portfolio policy with investments
in the currency market contributes to performance, including kurtosis
and skewness. The currency strategies increase Sharpe ratios and cer-
tainty equivalents and, most notably, they also reduce substantially the
excess kurtosis and left-skewness of diversied portfolios.
Our results make it hard to reconcile the economic value of currency
investing with the existence of some set of risk factors that drives returns
in currencies and other asset classes. The substantial increases in Sharpe
ratios combined with the lower crash risk indicate that there is either
a specic set of risk factors in the currency market or that currency
returns have been anomalous throughout our sample.
1.7 Speculative capital
We cannot justify the protability of our currency strategy as compen-
sation for risk. The obvious alternative explanation is market ine¢ -
ciency. This might arise due to insu¢ cient arbitrage capital, possibly
because strategies exploring the cross section of currency returns were
not well known. Jylhä and Suominen (2011) nd carry returns explain
hedge fund returns controlling for the other factors proposed by Fung
and Hsieh (2004) and that growth in hedge fund speculative capital is
driving carry trade prots down.
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Following Jylhä and Suominen (2011), we run an OLS regression of
the returns of the optimal strategy on hedge fund assets under man-
agement scaled by the monetary aggregate M2 of the 11 currencies in
their sample (AUM=M2) and new fund ows (AUM=M2):23 The re-
gression uses the out-of-sample returns, after transaction costs, of the
optimal strategy from 1996:03 to 2008:12 as the dependent variable. The
estimated coe¢ cients (and t-statistics in parenthesis) are:
rp;t = 0:08  1:47 (AUMM2 )t 1 +3:56 (
AUM
M2 )t
(4:29) ( 3:23) (0:36)
The new ow of capital to hedge funds is not signicant in the re-
gression but the estimated coe¢ cient has the correct sign. The level of
hedge fund capital predicts negatively the returns of the optimal strat-
egy. With a t-statistic of -3.23, this provides convincing evidence that
the returns of the diversied currency strategy are an anomaly that is
gradually being corrected as more hedge fund capital exploits it.
This opens the question whether the large returns of the strategy
are likely to continue going forward. We note that in the last three
years of our sample (2009-2011) the strategy produces a Sharpe ratio of
0.82, lower than its historical average but still an impressive performance
(though not much di¤erent than the stock market in the same period).
23We thank Matti Suominen for providing us the time series of AUM/M2. See their
paper for a more detailed description of the data.
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1.8 Conclusion
Diversied currency investments using the information of momentum,
yield di¤erential, and reversal, outperform the carry trade substantially.
This outperformance materializes in a higher Sharpe ratio and in less
severe drawdowns, as reversal and momentum had large positive returns
when the carry trade crashed. The performance of our optimal currency
strategy poses a problem to peso explanations of currency returns.
Our optimal currency portfolio picks stable coe¢ cients for the rel-
evant currency characteristics and, by dealing with transaction costs,
outperforms naive benchmarks proposed in the literature.
The economic performance of the optimal currency portfolio cannot
be explained by risk factors or time-varying risk. This suggests market
ine¢ ciency or, at least, that the right risk factors to explain currency
momentum and reversal returns have not been identied yet. Investing
in currencies signicantly improves the performance of diversied port-
folios already exposed to stocks and bonds. So currencies either o¤er
exposure to some set of unknown risk factors or have anomalous returns.
The most convincing explanation for the returns of our optimal di-
versied currency portfolio is that it constitutes an anomaly one which
is being gradually arbitraged away as speculative capital increases in the
foreign exchange market.
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Strategy Max Min Mean std kurt skew SR CE
fd 15.91 -25.39 19.23 19.47 4.48 -1.23 0.99 18.97
mom 17.31 -11.60 8.01 14.23 1.80 0.21 0.56 11.61
rev 8.38 -11.31 3.09 8.72 2.24 -0.26 0.36 8.95
sign 21.29 -30.11 17.96 18.74 7.35 -0.90 0.96 18.29
ca 2.79 -3.47 0.61 3.86 1.24 -0.44 0.16 7.59
q 2.02 -2.32 0.12 1.79 4.44 -0.74 0.07 7.34
fd, mom, rev, sign 56.83 -32.78 44.30 32.89 5.54 0.66 1.35 34.72
All 60.38 -25.56 45.28 33.70 5.10 0.60 1.34 34.85
Table 1.1: The in-sample performance of the investment strategies in
the period 1976:02 to 1996:02. The optimizations use a power utility
with CRRA of 4. The mean, standard deviation and Sharpe ratio are
annualized and Kurt. stands for excess kurtosis
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fd mom rev sign ca q
7,93 - - - - -
[0; 000] - - - - -
- 5,10 - - - -
- [0; 009] - - - -
- - 3,46 - - -
- - [0; 053] - - -
- - - 3,71 - -
- - - [0; 000] - -
- - - - -2,19 -
- - - - [0; 247] -
- - - - - -0,15
- - - - - [0; 648]
4,75 8,10 6,57 2,67 -4,95 -1,08
[0; 051] [0; 019] [0; 078] [0; 085] [0; 621] [0; 828]
7,09 7,26 4,37 2,44 - -
[0; 004] [0; 006] [0; 051] [0; 023] - -
Table 1.2: The statistical signicance of the variables in the in-sample
period of 1976:02 to 1996:02. The coe¢ cient estimates and bootstrapped
p-values (in brackets).
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Max Min Mean std kurt skew SR CE
Panel A: No transaction costs
fd 18,64 -29,20 21,38 24,33 2,15 -0,82 0,88 10,89
mom 14,72 -10,03 4,97 13,29 0,57 0,04 0,37 4,39
rev 9,42 -9,67 1,69 9,50 1,42 0,23 0,18 2,84
sign 16,40 -21,21 15,01 21,37 1,95 -0,64 0,70 8,03
all in 26,90 -22,88 38,02 32,98 0,12 -0,14 1,15 18,87
Panel B: With transaction costs
fd 4,59 -10,92 2,80 7,40 5,01 -1,35 0,38 4,55
mom 0,64 -1,33 -0,02 0,66 17,41 -2,43 -0,03 2,88
rev 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 18,62 2,06 0,05 2,91
sign 12,12 -16,30 8,89 15,70 2,14 -0,67 0,57 6,59
all in 20,39 -18,31 19,20 22,20 0,54 -0,16 0,86 12,15
Panel C: With wi;t = I(cit < jFDitj)

Txi;t=Nt

fd 12,83 -20,70 11,91 17,18 2,66 -0,89 0,69 8,35
mom 6,67 -7,01 2,14 6,04 2,37 -0,07 0,35 4,33
rev 3,44 -3,84 -0,37 3,00 4,66 -0,16 -0,12 2,36
sign 18,10 -23,09 12,08 20,23 2,74 -0,76 0,60 5,98
all in 26,70 -22,75 28,48 26,84 0,69 -0,16 1,06 16,69
Table 1.3: The OOS performance of the investment strategies in the pe-
riod 1996:03 to 2011:12 with di¤erent methods to deal with transaction
costs. Panel A presents the results without considering transaction costs.
Panel B takes transaction costs into consideration. Panel C excludes all
currencies whenever the bid-ask spread is higher than the forward dis-
count, then adjusts the forward discount by the transaction cost. All
optimizations use a power utility function with a CRRA of 4 and the
coe¢ cients are re-estimated each month using an expanding window of
observations in the OOS period of 1996:03 to 2011:12.
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Strategy Max Min Mean std kurt skew SR CE
sign 24.72 -34.04 19.23 32.09 2.06 -0.61 0.60 -2.00
momb 63.26 -40.43 14.60 40.69 4.45 0.53 0.36 -17.53
sign+momb 55.78 -51.58 21.32 45.34 3.31 0.02 0.47 -27.72
fd 20.57 -29.16 17.54 23.77 2.73 -0.64 0.74 7.81
EW(sign; fd;mom; rev) 19.69 -25.77 22.76 27.09 1.17 -0.60 0.84 9.56
constant leverage 30.06 -22.39 27.73 27.89 0.92 -0.22 0.99 14.51
Optimal strategy 26.70 -22.75 28.48 26.84 0.69 -0.16 1.06 16.69
Table 1.4: The performance of naive portfolios in the OOS period com-
pared to the optimal strategy using sign, fd, momentum and reversal.
The naive strategies have a constant leverage of 5.94, the same as the
optimal strategy on average. The OOS returns are from 1996:03 to
2011:12. The optimization uses an expanding window of returns, re-
estimating the coe¢ cients each month. Results with transaction costs.
Strategy  t-stat  t-stat R2
sign 1.39 3.58 0.62 14.92 54.20
momb 2.28 4.05 0.08 1.57 1.30
sign+momb 1.89 3.74 0.27 7.10 21.17
fd 1.43 3.02 0.65 9.56 32.71
EW(sign; fd;mom; rev) 0.68 2.72 0.89 28.85 81.57
Table 1.5: The OOS performance of the optimal strategy regressed on
the naive portfolios. The regressions are standard OLS regressions. The
optimal strategy uses sign, fd, momentum and reversal and re-estimates
the coe¢ cients in the OOS period every month. Results after transaction
costs. The alphas are expressed in percentage points per month. The
OOS returns are from 1996:03 to 2011:12.
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1 2 3 4 Adj-Rsquared
ropt;t = + 1const + "t
2.08 1.31 - - - -0.10
[3:20] [0:90] - - - -
ropt;t = + 1TEDt + "t
2.38 -0.06 - - - 3.76
[4:31] [ 2:90] - - - -
ropt;t = + 1V IXt + "t
2.38 -0.46 - - - 7.27
[4:41] [ 3:98] - - - -
ropt;t = + 1ct + "t
2.37 26.80 - - - -0.42
[4:21] [0:45] - - - -
ropt;t = + 1FX:t + "t
2.38 -8.71 - - - 1.88
[4:28] [ 2:15] - - - -
ropt;t = + 1RMRFt + "t
2.19 0.44 - - - 7.43
[4:03] [4:02] - - - -
ropt;t = + 1RMRFt + 2SMB2 + 3HMLt + 4WMLt + "t
2.07 0.50 0.01 0.20 0.09 6.88
[3:74] [4:08] [0:05] [1:19] [0:87] -
ropt:t = + 1RXt + 2HMLFX:t + "t
1.73 0.32 1.35 - - 20.85
[3:37] [1:16] [6:54] - - -
Table 1.6: Risk exposures of the optimal strategy. We regress the OOS
returns of the optimal strategy (after transaction costs) on each set of
risk factors. Standard OLS coe¢ cients (and t-statistics in brackets).
The OOS returns are from 1996:03 to 2011:12.
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z  RMRFt RMRFtzt 1 Rbonds;t Rbonds;tzt 1 Adj-rsquared
FX 2.26 0.46 -0.07 -0.22 0.00 6.70
[3:95] [3:73] [ 0:85] [ 0:77] [0:01] -
TED 2.09 0.52 -0.15 -0.04 -0.19 9.31
[3:69] [4:33] [ 2:35] [ 0:14] [ 1:39] -
VIX 2.26 0.52 -0.15 -0.15 -0.07 7.51
[3:99] [3:99] [ 1:60] [ 0:53] [ 0:51] -
c 2.22 0.46 -0.08 -0.18 0.01 6.77
[3:85] [3:79] [ 1:04] [ 0:63] [0:06] -
leverage 2.20 0.46 0.15 -0.18 0.04 7.07
[3:84] [3:88] [1:29] [ 0:71] [0:14] -
Table 1.7: Time-varying risk of the optimal strategy. In each row we
regress the OOS returns, after transaction costs, of the optimal strat-
egy on the market and bond returns, using a di¤erent risk proxy as a
state variable to account for time-varying risk exposure. We standard-
ize all risk proxies subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation. Standard OLS coe¢ cients and t-statistics (in brackets). The
optimal strategy uses sign, fd, momentum and reversal and re-estimates
the coe¢ cients in the OOS period every month. The OOS returns are
from 1996:03 to 2011:12.
Strategy Max Min Mean STD Kurt. Skew SR CE
fd, mom, rev and sign 26,70 -22,75 28,48 26,84 0,69 -0,16 1,06 16,69
Stock market 7,16 -14,94 3,17 12,46 1,36 -0,81 0,25 2,83
Stock market+curr. 27,27 -21,87 27,95 26,93 0,73 -0,16 1,04 16,07
FF factors 19,89 -29,96 12,94 27,41 1,53 -0,84 0,47 -1,53
FF factors+curr. 31,75 -22,26 27,06 25,79 1,32 0,13 1,05 16,83
Carhart factors 33,51 -63,23 20,84 35,67 8,02 -1,37 0,58 -30,46
Carhart factors+curr. 19,29 -24,21 15,78 22,92 0,94 -0,45 0,69 7,58
Stocks and bonds 8,13 -13,74 5,39 12,16 2,15 -0,93 0,44 5,19
Stock and bonds+curr. 23,53 -22,67 27,98 27,47 0,80 -0,28 1,02 15,19
Table 1.8: The OOS performance of portfolios combining a currency
strategy with di¤erent background assets. The currency strategy uses
momentum, the interest rate spread, reversal and sign. Each row de-
noted with +curr. combines the available factors with the currency
strategy. Results with transaction costs. Optimizations carried out
with a CRRA of 4 and 240 months in the initial in-sample estimate.
The OOS period is from 1996:03 to 2011:12.
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Figure 1.1: The performance of Deutsche Bank currency ETFs (in eu-
ros). Each line plots the cumulative monthly returns of a Deutsche Bank
ETF from 2008:01 to 2011:12.
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Figure 1.2: The estimates of the coe¢ cients of the portfolio in the OOS
period from 1996:03 to 2011:12. Optimization with CRRA of 4 and
considering transaction costs.
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Figure 1.3: OOS performance of the strategies versus naive portfolios in
the period of 1996:03 to 2011:12. The naive currency strategies have a
constant leverage of 5.94 to match the mean leverage of the optimized
strategy in the OOS period. Returns after transaction costs.
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Figure 1.4: The OOS value of currency strategies for investors exposed
to di¤erent background risks. Each set of columns shows the perfor-
mance of an optimized portfolio with the available assets (light grey)
and one which combines it with the currency strategy (dark grey). The
currency strategy uses the information on the interest rate spread, sign,
momentum and reversal. The OOS period is from 1996:03 to 2011:12.
Results with transaction costs.
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Chapter 2
The Bottom-up Beta of
Momentum
2.1 Introduction
Unconditionally, the Fama-French factors do not explain the risk or re-
turns of momentum (Fama and French (1996)). But Grundy and Mar-
tin (2001) argue this is because momentum portfolios have time-varying
systematic risk, which is not captured in unconditional regressions. The
winners-minus-losers beta should depend by construction on the previ-
ous returns of the market.
For instance, in late 1999, and after good returns in the stock market,
the winners tended naturally to be high beta stocks while the laggards
should mainly be low beta stocks. Hence the momentum portfolio, short
on previous losers and long on previous winners, should have a high
beta by design. By contrast, at the end of 2008, in an extreme bear
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market, previous losers should be typically stocks with high betas such as
nancials, while the group of winner stocks would have low betas. Thus
the momentum portfolio would have a negative beta by construction.
But Grundy and Martin (2001) did not actually examined if the
composition of the momentum portfolio changes over time as their con-
jecture suggests. For that one needs to estimate the betas of individual
stocks at each point in time and from these obtain the aggregate beta
of the portfolio from the bottom up.
In this work, we compute the bottom-up beta of momentum using
monthly returns from January 1950 to December 2012 for all stocks in
the Center of Research for Security Prices (CRSP). This allows a direct
test of Grundy and Martins (2001) conjecture. We nd the bottom-up
beta changes quite substantially over time, ranging from a minimum of
-1.71 to a maximum of 2.09 and that it is positively related to previous
returns in the market. The conjecture is thus conrmed.
Bottom-up betas are much better at explaining the risk of momen-
tum than an unconditional regression. The bottom-up betas with re-
spect to the Fama-French factors explain 39.59 percent of the out-of-
sample variation in momentum returns, nearly 17 times more than one
unconditional regression.
The bottom-up betas do not explain the alpha of momentum though,
60
which remains signicantly positive. This conrms that it is not persis-
tence in the returns of the Fama-French factors that explain momentum
prots (Grundy and Martin (2001), Blitz, Huij, and Martens (2011)).
Using bottom-up betas to hedge the risk of momentum in real time
does not avoid its large drawdowns. The hedged strategy still has a
high excess kurtosis and a pronounced left-skew. This conrms Daniel
and Moskowitz (2011) who also nd momentum investors could not use
time-varying betas to avoid the crashes in real time.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2, explains the es-
timation method of the conditional betas with respect to the CAPM
model and discuss whether these can explain the risk and returns of mo-
mentum. Section 2.3 extends the analysis to the Fama-French factors.
Section 2.4 shows the performance of the hedged momentum strategies
and section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The time-varying beta of momentum
The momentum portfolio changes its composition as new stocks join the
group of previous losers or the group of previous winners. This changing
composition should induce time variation in the beta of the portfolio
with respect to the market. We compare three methods of estimation
of these time-varying betas: i) a bottom-up approach; ii) estimating
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beta as a linear function of factor returns in the formation period; iii) a
high-frequency beta estimated from daily returns.
To estimate the bottom-up betas, we use data from CRSP (Center for
Research in Security Prices) with monthly returns for all stocks listed in
the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ from January 1950 to December 2010.
Following the standard practice, the momentum portfolios are sorted
according to accumulated returns in the formation period which is from
month t-12 to month t 2. The stocks are classied into deciles using as
cuto¤points the universe of all rms listed on the NYSE. This way there
is an equal number of rms listed in the NYSE in each decile. This is
to prevent the possibility of very small rms dominating either the long
or short leg of the portfolio.
In order to be considered in the portfolio a rms stock must have a
valid return in month t 2, a valid price in month t 13, and information
on the market capitalization of the rm in the previous month. We take
into consideration the delisting return of a stock whenever it is available.
Individual stocks are value-weighted within each decile. The return of
the winner-minus-losers (WML) is simply the return of the top decile
portfolio, sorted on previous momentum, minus the return of the bottom
decile portfolio.
We estimate the beta of each individual stock running an OLS re-
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gression of its monthly excess return on the excess return of the market
from t   61 to t   2, the end of the formation period. We require at
least 24 valid returns in that period to estimate the beta. The market
return is the value-weighted return of all stocks in the CRSP universe,
as obtained from Kenneth Frenchs online data library.
The bottom-up beta of the momentum portfolio is the weighted av-
erage of individual betas in the portfolio:
BU;t =
NtX
i=1
wi;t̂i;t (2.1)
where Nt is the number of stocks in the portfolio at time t, wi;t is the
weight of stock i in the WML portfolio and ̂i;t is the beta of the individ-
ual stock estimated from past monthly returns. This beta relies only on
past information, known before time t; so its forecasts are out-of-sample
(OOS) by construction.
Figure 2.1 shows the bottom-up beta of the momentum strategy
and compares it with the unconditional beta, obtained from running a
regression of the WML on the market with the full sample.
The unconditional beta is -0.27. So on average the losers portfolio
has a higher beta than the winners portfolio. But this unconditional
beta masks substantial time-variation in the composition of the WML
portfolio. The bottom-up beta ranges from -1.71 to 2.09. Therefore,
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the momentum strategy is at times highly exposed to the overall stock
market, while at other times it is actually negatively related with the
market.
The conjecture of Grundy and Martin (2001) is that the time-varying
systematic risk of momentum is due to the return of the overall market
during the formation period. After bear markets, winners tend to be
low-beta stocks while losers are high-beta stocks. By shorting losers to
go long winners, the WML portfolio will have by construction a negative
beta. The opposite happens after bull markets. Figure 2.2 shows their
conjecture holds true.
Our bottom-up beta, obtained from the individual stock level, is
approximately a linear function of market returns during the formation
period. Following Grundy and Martin (2001), we estimate this beta
running an OLS regression:
rwml;t = + 0rmrft + 1rmrftrmrft 2;t 12 (2.2)
where rmrft 2;t 12 is the cumulative gross return of the market during
the formation period of the momentum portfolio. Then the time-varying
linear beta is:
L;t = 0 + 1rmrft 2;t 12 (2.3)
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The third method to estimate the time-varying beta of momentum is
to use the daily returns of the WML portfolio and those of the market.
Following Daniel and Moskowitz (2011) we regress at the end of each
month the daily returns of momentum on the market in the previous 126
sessions ( 6 months).1 As the bottom-up beta, the one-month lagged
high-frequency beta (HF;t 1) produces an OOS forecast of momentums
exposure to the market.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for the four estimates of beta.
The unconditional beta is the estimate from on OLS regression, which
is constant. The rst two rows show the in-sample results for unc and
L using returns from 1964:02 to 2010:12.
2 The third and fourth rows
present the OOS results for the same variables. Here we use the pe-
riod from 1950:01 to 1964:01 to obtain initial estimates of the betas,
producing an OOS forecast for the following month. Then we reiterate
the procedure every month till the end of the sample using an expand-
ing window of monthly observations. The resulting OOS period is from
1964:02 to 2010:12.
The in-sample (out-of-sample) linear beta varies between a minimum
1They estimate the beta using 10 lags of daily returns to correct for stale quotes.
This correction does not improve results in my sample period, so we only report
results from regressions with no lags.
2To facilitate the comparison, the same sample period is examined for all methods.
The daily returns of the Fama-French factors is only available starting in 1963:07.
This restricts the comparable sample period to start in 1964:02.
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of -1.74 (-1.60) and a maximum of 1.61 (1.46). The high-frequency beta
varies even more from a minimum of -1.94 to a maximum of 2.16. So all
estimates show there is substantial time-variation in the market exposure
of the momentum strategy.
The most relevant test is whether time-varying betas explain the risk
and returns of momentum. For each estimation method we obtain the
hedged momentum return as:
zt = rwml;t   btrmrft (2.4)
where bt is the conditional beta at time t:
Table 2.2 shows that time-varying risk does not explain the excess re-
turns of the momentum strategy. The mean excess return of the market-
hedged momentum strategy ranges from 1.19 percent per month to 1.47
percent per month. All the t-statistics exceed four, so they are highly
signicant. This conrms the results of Grundy and Martin (2001) and
Blitz, Huij, and Martens (2011). Grundy and Martin (2001) show that
time-varying risk does not explain the alpha of momentum. Conversely,
Blitz, Huij, and Martens (2011) show that momentum prots come from
persistence in returns at the individual stock level, rather than in the
factors themselves. As a result, hedging market risk has little e¤ect on
the alpha of momentum.
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Momentum has more beta risk in good times(in bull markets) than
in bad times(in bear markets). The opposite pattern should hold for
time-varying beta to explain momentum average excess returns.
But taking time-varying betas into consideration enhances substan-
tially the understanding of momentums risk.
The r-squared (1   var(zt)var(rwml;t)) improves OOS from just 1.93 per-
cent for the unconditional model to values ranging from 15.78 percent
to 24.81 percent using the conditional models.3 This is 8 to nearly 13
times more than the unconditional model. The bottom-up beta per-
forms particularly well OOS, with the highest r-squared among those
considered.
2.3 Exposure to the Fama-French factors
One unconditional OLS regression of monthly momentum returns on
the Fama-French factors from 1964:02 to 2010:12 holds (t-statistics in
parenthesis):
rWML;t = 1:71   0:34 rRMRF;t   0:04 rSMB;t   0:47 rHML;t
(5:70) ( 4:91) ( 0:42) ( 4:51)
3Note that the OOS r-squared can assume negative values. Goyal and Welch
(2008) show this is often the case with predictive regressions.
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The regression has an adjusted r-squared of just 5.63 percent and a
signicant positive alpha of 1.71 percent, conrming the result in Fama
and French (1996) that their factors do not explain the risk and returns
of momentum. Still, this improves substantially the t of the CAPM,
which has an adjusted r-squared of just 2.54 percent for the same period.
This is mainly because momentum is signicantly and negatively related
to value. Yet, as for the exposure to the market, these estimates mask
substantial time-variation in risk.
Figure 2.3 shows the exposure of momentum to the market (RMRF),
value (HML), and size (SMB) factors. Just as for the market, exposure
to value and size varies a lot.
Table 2.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the bottom-up betas.
The exposure of the momentum portfolio to size and value varies even
more than the exposure to the market. For the HML factor, the beta
ranges from -3.06 to 2.61, while for the market it ranges only from -1.62
to 1.58. The standard deviation of the betas with respect to size and
value are, respectively, 0.82 and 0.83. This is over the double of the 0.40
standard deviation of rmrf .
Table 2.4 shows the average excess returns of the hedged portfolio
with respect to the Fama-French factors, its t-statistics and r-squared.
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As for the CAPM, the conditional models do not explain the mean
excess returns of momentum which have always a positive mean with
signicant t-statistics ranging between 3.57 (for the bottom-up beta)
and 6.48 (for the beta linear with past returns).
However, the conditional models improve considerably the under-
standing of the systematic risk of momentum. In sample, the r-squared
of the unconditional model is 6.13 percent, which is reduced to only 2.37
percent in the out-of-sample (OOS) test. The high-frequency beta, used
in Daniel and Moskowitz (2011), produces an OOS r-squared of 29 per-
cent. In spite of this large improvement, the high frequency approach
underperforms other measures of systematic risk. The linear model has
an OOS r-squared of 37.72 percent. Even more so, bottom-up betas
explain 39.59 percent of the systematic risk of momentum OOS. This is
nearly 17 times more than the unconditional model. As for the CAPM,
the bottom-up beta is the best conditional model to explain the system-
atic risk of momentum.
2.4 Systematic risk and momentum crashes
Grundy and Martin (2001) nd that hedging the time-varying risk ex-
posures of momentum produces stable returns. Daniel and Moskowitz
(2011) show that this relies on using ex post information. Hedging in
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real time with time-varying betas does not avoid the momentum crashes.
However, their method of estimating the time varying risk is with top-
down regressions of daily data the high-frequency beta. We nd this
is the less satisfactory approach to capture the time-varying systematic
risk of momentum (although it still clearly outperforms an unconditional
model).
Bottom-up betas provide a superior method to estimate the time-
varying exposure of momentum to other factors. This leads to the
question of whether hedging this time-varying risk with a more suit-
able method could avoid the large drawdowns of momentum.
Table 2.5 shows the performance of hedged portfolios using bottom-
up betas. Hedging market risk or the Fama-French factor exposures
reduces the excess kurtosis and left-skewness of returns, without a clear
e¤ect on the Sharpe ratio (it improves using the CAPM but decreases
using the Fama-French factors). The reduction in crash risk is modest
though. The hedged strategies have an excess kurtosis exceeding 5 and
a left-skew almost as pronounced as the WML strategy. This conrms
the result of Daniel and Moskowitz (2011) that using time-varying betas
does not avoid the crashes in real time. It also conrms the result in
chapter 3 that it is not time-varying systematic risk but rather risk
specic to momentum that forecasts crashes.
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2.5 Conclusion
When the previous returns of a factor are high, the momentum portfolio
rotates from low-beta stocks to high-beta stocks on that factor. This
changes the betas of momentum over time.
Conditional betas capture the systematic risk of momentum much
better than an unconditional model. Using the Fama-French factors, the
out-of-sample r-squared increases from just 2.37 percent for the uncon-
ditional model to as much as 39.59 percent using conditional betas.
The bottom-up betas perform particularly well in capturing time
variation in systematic risk. They achieve the best results comparing to
the linear and the high-frequency beta, both with the CAPM and the
Fama-French factors.
Using this method to manage the time-varying risk does not avoid
momentum crashes though.
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Beta Mean Max Min STD(B)
unc (IS) -0.26 - - -
L (IS) -0.12 1.61 -1.74 0.52
unc -0.08 0.07 -0.24 0.07
L -0.06 1.46 -1.60 0.38
BU -0.05 2.09 -1.71 0.57
HF 0.15 2.16 -1.94 0.62
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of di¤erent betas of momentum. The
rst two rows present results for in-sample betas and the others for out-
of-sample betas. All betas are from 1964:02 to 2010:12.
Beta zt zt=zt R
2
unc (IS) 1.47 4.95 2.71
L (IS) 1.43 5.36 22.14
unc 1.40 4.70 1.93
L 1.37 5.11 20.39
BU 1.34 5.15 24.81
HF 1.19 4.32 15.78
Table 2.2: Performance of time-varying betas in explaining excess re-
turns and risk of the momentum strategy. The rst two rows present
results for in-sample betas and the others for out-of-sample betas. All
hedged returns and betas are from 1964:02 to 2010:12.
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Figure 2.1: Bottom-up and unconditional beta of the WML portfolio.
The bottom-up beta of the WML portfolio is obtained from the previous
5 years monthly returns of individual stocks. Returns from 1955:03 to
2010:12.
Beta Mean Max Min STD(B)
Rm-Rf -0.03 1.58 -1.62 0.40
SMB -0.03 2.25 -1.91 0.82
HML 0.07 2.61 -3.06 0.83
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of the conditional betas of the WML
portfolio (bottom-up) for the Fama-French (1992) model. All betas are
from 1955:03 to 2010:12.
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Figure 2.2: The bottom-up market beta of the WML portfolio and the
previous return on the market portfolio. All returns from 1955:03 to
2010:12.
74
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-1
0
1
B
et
a
Load on Rm-Rf
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-1
0
1
2
B
et
a
Load on SMB
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-2
0
2
B
et
a
Load on HML
Figure 2.3: The loading of the WML on the FF factors (bottom-up
betas). The sample period is from 1955:02 to 2010:02.
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Beta zt zt=zt R
2
unc (IS) 1.71 5.85 6.13
L (IS) 1.48 6.48 42.73
unc 1.65 5.56 2.37
L 1.39 5.85 37.72
BU 0.84 3.57 39.59
HF 1.29 5.1 29.00
Table 2.4: Performance of time-varying betas with respect to the Fama-
French factors in explaining excess returns and risk of the momentum
strategy. The rst two rows present results for in-sample betas and the
others for out-of-sample betas. All hedged returns and betas are from
1964:02 to 2010:12.
Max Min Mean STD KURT SKEW Sharpe
WML 25.54 -45.53 16.14 24.65 7.89 -1.52 0.65
Market hedged 23.41 -38.05 15.98 21.33 5.77 -1.22 0.75
FF hedged 24.07 -37.12 9.87 19.09 6.81 -1.17 0.52
Table 2.5: Performance of the hedged portfolios. In each case the betas
are estimated bottom-up. The results are thus OOS. Kurt stands for
excess kurtosis. Returns from 1964:02 to 2010:12.
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Chapter 3
Managing the Risk of
Momentum0
3.1 Introduction
Momentum is a pervasive anomaly in asset prices. Jegadeesh and Tit-
man (1993) nd that previous winners in the US stock market outper-
form previous losers by as much as 1.49 percent a month. The Sharpe
ratio of this strategy exceeds the Sharpe ratio of the market itself, as
well as the size and value anomalies. Momentum returns are even more
of a puzzle since they are negatively related to the market and the value
risk factors. From 1927 to 2011, momentum had a monthly excess re-
turn of 1.75 percent per month controlling for the Fama-French factors.
This result has led researchers to use momentum as an additional risk
0We thank Eduardo Schwartz for helpful comments and Kent Daniel for letting us
use his data.
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factor.1 Momentum is not just a US stock market anomaly. Momentum
has been documented in European equities, emerging markets, country
stock indices, industry portfolios, currency markets, commodities and
across asset classes.2 Grinblatt and Titman (1989,1993) found most
mutual fund managers incorporate momentum of some sort in their in-
vestment decisions, so relative strength strategies are widespread among
practitioners.
But the remarkable performance of momentum comes with occa-
sional large crashes.3 In 1932, the winners-minus-losers strategy deliv-
ered a -91.59 percent return in just two months. In 2009 momentum ex-
perienced another signicant crash of -73.42 percent over three months.
Even the large returns of momentum do not compensate an investor
with reasonable risk version for these sudden crashes that take decades
to recover from.
The two most expressive momentum crashes occurred as the market
rebounded following large previous declines. One explanation for this
pattern is the time-varying systematic risk of the momentum strategy.
Grundy and Martin (2001) show that momentum has signicant negative
1Carhart (1997)
2See Rouwenhorst (1998,1999) for international evidence, Asness, Liew, and
Stevens (1997) for country stock indices, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) for in-
dustry portfolios, Okunev and White (2003) and Menkhof, Sarno, Schmeling, and
Schrimpf (2012) for currency markets, Erb and Harvey (2006) for commodities and
Asness, Moskowitz, and Pederson (2011) for momentum across asset classes.
3Daniel and Moskowitz (2011)
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beta following bear markets.4 They argue that hedging this time-varying
market exposure produces stable momentum returns but Daniel and
Moskowitz (2011) show that using betas in real time does not avoid the
crashes.
In this chapter we propose a di¤erent method to manage momentum
risk. We estimate the risk of momentum by the realized variance of
daily returns and nd that it is highly predictable. An auto-regression
of monthly realized variances yields an out-of-sample (OOS) R-square
of 57.82 percent. This is 19.01 percentage points (p.p.) more than a
similar auto-regression for the variance of the market portfolio which is
already famously predictable.5
Making use of this predictability in risk management leads to sub-
stantial economic gains. We scale the long-short portfolio by its realized
volatility in the previous 6 months, thereby obtaining a strategy with
constant volatility. The Sharpe ratio improves from 0.53 for unmanaged
momentum to 0.97 for its risk-managed version. But the most important
benet comes from a reduction in crash risk. The excess kurtosis drops
from 18.24 to 2.68 and the left skew improves from -2.47 to -0.42. The
minimum one-month return for momentum is -78.96 percent while for
4Following negative returns for the overall market, winners tend to be low-beta
stocks and the reverse for losers. Therefore the winner-minus-losers strategy will have
a negative beta.
5Engle and Bollerslev (1986), Schwert (1989).
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risk-managed momentum is -28.40 percent. The maximum drawdown of
momentum was -96.69 percent versus -45.20 percent for its risk-managed
version.
To assess the economic signicance of our results, we evaluate the
benets of risk management for a risk-averse investor using a power util-
ity function with Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) of four. The
representative investor holding the market portfolio has an annual cer-
tainty equivalent of 0.14 percent. Adding momentum to the portfolio
reduces this certainty equivalent to -5.46 percent. However, combining
the market with risk-managed momentum already achieves a certainty
equivalent of 13.54 percent. We nd that the main benet of risk man-
agement comes in the form of smaller crash risk. This alone provides a
gain of 14.96 p.p. in annual certainty equivalent.
One pertinent question is why managing risk with realized variances
works while using time-varying betas does not. To answer this question
we decompose the risk of momentum into systematic risk (from time-
varying exposure to the market) and specic risk. We nd that the
systematic component is only 23 percent of total risk on average, so
most of the risk of momentum is specic. This specic risk is more
persistent and predictable than the systematic component. The OOS
R-square of the specic component is 47 percent versus 21 percent for
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the systematic component. This is why hedging with time-varying betas
fails: it focuses on the smaller part of risk and also the less predictable
one.
The work that is more closely related to ours is Grundy and Mar-
tin (2001) and Daniel and Moskowitz (2011). But their work focuses
on the time-varying systematic risk of momentum, while we focus on
momentums specic risk. Our results have the distinct advantage of of-
fering investors using momentum strategies an e¤ective way to manage
risk without forward-looking bias. The resulting risk-managed strategy
deepens the puzzle of momentum.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the long-
run properties of momentum returns and its exposure to crashes. Section
3.3 shows that momentum risk varies substantially over time in a highly
predictable manner. We analyze the implications of such predictability
for risk management in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 decomposes the gains of
risk management according to the moments of returns. In Section 3.6
we decompose the risk of momentum and study the persistence of each
of its components. Finally, Section 3.7 presents our conclusions.
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3.2 Momentum in the long run
We compare momentum to the Fama-French factors using a long sample
of 85 years of monthly returns from July 1926 to December 2011.6 This
is the same sample period as in Daniel and Moskowitz (2011).
Figure 3.1 presents the cumulative returns of each factor. As each
factor consists of a long-short strategy, we construct the series of returns
assuming the investor puts $1 in the risk-free asset at the beginning of the
sample, buys $1 worth of the long portfolio and sells the same amount
of the short portfolio. Then in each subsequent month, the strategy
fully reinvests the accumulated wealth in the risk-free asset, assuming a
position of this same size in the long and short leg of the portfolio. The
winners-minus-losers (WML) strategy o¤ered an impressive performance
for investors. One dollar fully reinvested in the momentum strategy grew
to $68,741 by the end of the sample. This compares to the cumulative
return of $2,136 from simply holding the market portfolio.
There would be nothing puzzling about momentums returns if they
corresponded to a very high exposure to risk. However, running an
OLS regression of the WML on the Fama-French factors gives (t-stats
in parenthesis):
6See the annex for a description of the data.
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rWML;t = 1:752  0:378 rRMRF;t  0:249 rSMB;t  0:677 rHML;t
(7:93) ( 8:72) ( 3:58) ( 10:76)
so momentum provided abnormal returns of 1.75 percent per month
with negative exposure to the Fama and French (1992) risk factors. This
amounts to a 21 percent per year abnormal return and the negative
loadings on other risk factors imply momentum actually diversied risk
in this extended sample.
Table 3.1 compares descriptive statistics for momentum in the long-
run with the Fama-French factors. Buying winners and shorting losers
has provided large returns of 14.46 percent per year, with a Sharpe ratio
higher than the market. The impressive excess returns of momentum, its
high Sharpe ratio and negative relation to other risk factors, particularly
the value premium, make it look like a free lunch for investors.
But as Daniel and Moskowitz (2011) show there is a dark side to
momentum. Its large gains come at the expense of a very high excess
kurtosis of 18.24 combined with a pronounced left-skew of -2.47. These
two features of the distribution of returns of the momentum strategy
imply a very fat left tail signicant crash risk. The apparent free lunch
of momentum returns can very rapidly turn into a free fall, wiping out
decades of returns.
Figure 3.2 shows the performance of momentum in the two most
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turbulent decades for the strategy: the 1930s and the 2000s.
In July and August 1932, momentum had a cumulative return of
-91.59 percent. From March to May 2009, momentum had another large
crash of -73.42 percent. These short periods leave an enduring impact
on cumulative returns. For example, someone investing one dollar in
the WML strategy in July 1932 would only recover it in April 1963, 31
years after and with considerably less real value. This puts the risk to
momentum investing in an adequate long-run perspective.
Both in 1932 and in 2009, the crashes happened as the market re-
bounded after experiencing large losses.7 This leads to the question of
whether investors could predict the crashes in real time and hedge them
away.
Grundy and Martin (2001) show that momentum has a substantial
time-varying loading on stock market risk. The strategy ranks stocks ac-
cording to returns during a formation period, for example the previous
12 months. If the stock market performed well in the formation pe-
riod, winners tend to be high-beta stocks and losers low-beta stocks. So
the momentum strategy, by shorting losers to buy winners, has by con-
struction a signicant time-varying beta: positive after bull markets and
negative after bear markets. They argue that hedging this time-varying
7Daniel and Moskowitz (2011) argue this is due to the option-like payo¤s of dis-
tressed rms in bear markets.
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risk produces stable returns, even in pre-WWII data, when momentum
performed poorly. In particular, the hedging strategy would be long
in the market portfolio whenever momentum has negative betas, hence
mitigating the e¤ects of rebounds following bear markets, which is when
momentum experiences the worst returns. But the hedging strategy in
Grundy and Martin (2001) uses forward looking betas, estimated with
information investors did not have in real time. Daniel and Moskowitz
(2011) show that using betas estimated solely on ex-ante information
does not avoid the crashes and portfolios hedged in real time perform
even worse than unhedged momentum.
3.3 The time-varying risk of momentum
One possible cause for the excess kurtosis of momentum is time-varying
risk.8 The very high excess kurtosis of 18.24 of the momentum strategy
(more than twice the market portfolio) leads us to study the dynamics
of its risk and compare it with the market (RMRF), value (HML) and
size (SMB) risk factors.
For each month, we compute the realized variance RVt from daily
returns in the previous 21 sessions. Let frdgDd=1 be the daily returns and
fdtgTt=1 the time series of the dates of the last trading sessions of each
8See, for example, Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1987).
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month. Then the realized variance of factor i in month t is:9
RVi;t =
20X
j=0
r2dt j (3.1)
Figure 3.4 shows the monthly realized volatility of momentum. This
varies substantially over time, from a minimum of 3.04 percent (annu-
alized) to a maximum of 127.87 percent.
Table 3.2 shows the results of AR (1) regressions with the realized
variances of the WML, RMRF, SMB and HML:
RVi;t = + RVi;t 1 + "t (3.2)
Panel A presents the results for RMRF and WML, for which we have
daily data available from 1927:03 to 2011:12. Panel B adds the results for
HML and SMB, for which daily data is available from 1963:07 onwards.
Momentum returns are the most volatile. From 1927:03 to 2011:12,
the average realized volatility of momentum was 15.03, more than the
12.81 of the market portfolio. For the 1963:07 onwards sample, the
average realized volatility of momentum was 16.40, the highest when
compared to RMRF, SMB and HML.
In the full sample period, the standard deviation of monthly real-
9Correcting for serial correlation of daily returns does not change the results
signicantly.
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ized volatilities is higher for momentum (12.26) than the market (7.82).
Panel B conrms this result for the other factors in the 1963:07 onwards
sample. So the risk of momentum is the most variable.
The risk of momentum is also the most persistent. TheAR(1) coe¢ cient
of momentum in the 1963:07 sample is 0.77, which is 0.19 more than the
market for the same sample period and higher than the estimate for
SMB and HML.
To check the out-of-sample (OOS) predictability of risk, we use a
training sample of 240 months to run an initial AR(1) and then use
the estimated coe¢ cients and last observation of realized variance to
forecast the realized variance in the following month. Then each month
we use an expanding window of observations to produce OOS forecasts
and compare these to the accuracy of the historical mean RV i;t. As a
measure of goodness of t we estimate the OOS R-square as:
R2i;OOS = 1 
T 1P
t=S
(bt + btRVi;t  RVi;t+1)2
T 1P
t=S
(RV i;t  RVi;t+1)2
(3.3)
where S is the initial training sample, bt;bt and RV i;t are estimated
with information available only up to time t.
The last column of table 3.2 shows the OOS R-squares of each auto-
regression. The AR(1) of the realized variance of momentum has an
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OOS R-square of 57.82 percent (full sample), which is 50 percent more
than the market. For the period from 1963:07 to 2011:12, the OOS
predictability of momentum-risk is twice that of the market. Hence
more than half of the risk of momentum is predictable, the highest level
among risk factors. In the next section we explore the potential of this
predictability for risk management.
3.4 Risk-managed momentum
We use estimates of momentum risk to scale the exposure to the strategy
in order to have constant risk over time.
For each month we compute a variance forecast ̂2t from daily returns
in the previous 6 months.10 Let frWML;tgTt=1 be the monthly returns
of momentum and frWML;dgDd=1; fdtgTt=1 be, as above, the daily returns
and the time series of the dates of the last trading sessions of each month.
The variance forecast is:
̂2t = 21
125X
j=0
r2dt 1 j=126 (3.4)
As WML is a zero-investment and self-nancing strategy we can
scale it without constraints. We use the forecasted variance to scale the
10We also used one-month and three-month realized variances as well as
exponentially-weighted moving average (EWMA) with half-lifes of 1, 3 and 6 months.
All worked well with nearly identical results.
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returns:
rWML;t =
target
̂t
rWML;t (3.5)
where rWML;t is the unscaled or plain momentum, rWML;t is the scaled
or risk-managed momentum, and target is a constant corresponding to
the target level of volatility. Scaling corresponds to having a weight in
the long and short legs that is di¤erent from one and varies over time,
but it is still a self-nancing strategy, so the choice of the constant is
arbitrary. We pick a target corresponding to an annualized volatility of
12 percent.11
Figure 3.3 shows the cumulative returns of risk-managed momentum
compared to plain momentum. The risk-managed momentum strategy
achieves a higher cumulative return with less risk. So there are eco-
nomic gains to risk-management of momentum. The scaled strategy
benets from the large momentum returns when it performs well and
e¤ectively shuts it o¤ in turbulent times, thus mitigating momentum
crashes. As a result, one dollar invested in risk-managed momentum
grows to $6,140,075 by the end of the sample, nearly 90 times more
than the plain momentum strategy.12 Also, the risk-managed strategy
11The annualized standard deviation from monthly returns will be higher than
12% as volatilities at daily frequency are not directly comparable to those at lower
frequencies due to small positive autocorrelation of daily returns.
12This di¤erence in cumulative returns is fundamentally due to risk management
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no longer has variable and persistent risk, so risk management indeed
works.13
Table 3.3 provides a summary of the economic performance ofWML
in 1927-2011. The risk-managed strategy has a higher average return,
with a gain of 2.04 (p.p. per year), with substantially less standard
deviation (less 10.58 p.p. per year). As a result, the Sharpe ratio of
risk-managed portfolios almost doubles from 0.53 to 0.97. The most
important gains of risk-management show up in the improvement in the
higher order moments. Managing the risk of momentum drops the ex-
cess kurtosis from a very high value of 18.24 to just 2.68 and reduces the
left skew from -2.47 to -0.42. This practically eliminates the crash risk
of momentum. Figure 3.5 shows the density function of momentum and
its risk-managed version. Momentum has a very long left tail which is
much reduced in its risk-managed version.
The benets of risk-management are specially important in turbulent
times. Figure 3.6 shows the performance of risk-managed momentum in
the decades with the most impressive crashes. The scaled momentum
successfully avoiding the two momentum crashes. But in the post-war period from
1946 to 2007, not including the crashes, the Sharpe ratio of momentum was 0.86,
versus 1.15 for risk-managed momentum. So risk management also contributes to
performance in not so turbulent times.
13The AR(1) coe¢ cient of monthly squared returns is only 0.14 for the scaled
momentum versus 0.40 for the original momentum. Besides, the auto-correlation of
momentum is signicant up to 15 lags while only 1 lag for risk-managed momentum.
So persistence in risk is much smaller for the risk-managed strategy.
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manages to preserve the investment in the 1930s. This compares very
favorably to the pure momentum strategy which loses 90 percent in the
same period. In the 2000s simple momentum lost 28 percent of wealth,
because of the crash in 2009. Risk-managed momentum ends the decade
up 88 percent as it not only avoids the crash but also captures part of
the positive returns of 2007-2008.
Figure 3.7 shows the weights of the scaled momentum strategy over
time interpreted as the dollar amount in the long or short leg. These
range between the values of 0.13 and 2.00, reaching the most signicant
lows in the early 1930s, in 2000-02, and in 2008-09. On average, the
weight is just 0.90, slightly less than full exposure to momentum. As
these weights depend only on ex ante information this strategy could
actually be implemented in real time.
3.5 Economic Signicance: An Investor Per-
spective
Momentum o¤ers a trade-o¤ between an appealing Sharpe ratio, ob-
tained from the rst two moments of its distribution, and less appealing
higher order moments, such as high kurtosis and left skewness. An eco-
nomic criterion is needed to assess whether this trade-o¤ is interesting.
Risk management o¤ers improvements to momentum across the board,
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higher expected returns, lower standard deviation and crash risk. Still
it is pertinent to evaluate the relative economic importance of each of
these contributions.
We use an utility-based approach to discuss the appeal of momentum
to a representative investor. We adopt the power utility function as it has
the advantage of taking into consideration higher order moments instead
of focusing merely on the mean and standard deviation of returns. This
is particularly suitable as momentum has a distribution far from normal.
The utility of returns is:
U(r) =
(1 + r)1 
1   (3.6)
where  is the Constant Coe¢ cient of Relative risk aversion (CRRA).
Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) estimate  empirically from risk-aversion
implicit in one-month options on the S&P and the FTSE and nd a value
very close to 4. This is a more plausible value for CRRA than previous
estimates featured in the equity premium puzzle literature using utility
over consumption. So we adopt this value for CRRA. We obtain the
certainty equivalent from the utility of returns:
CE(r) = f(1  )E[U(r)]g
1
1    1 (3.7)
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This states the welfare a series of returns o¤ers the investor in terms of
an equivalent risk-free annual return, expressed in a convenient unit of
percentage points (p.p.) per year.
For an economic measure of the importance of the mean return,
variance and higher order moments, we use a Taylor series approximation
to expected utility around the mean:
E[U(r)] = U(r) +
1
2
U 00(r)E(r   r)2 + 3(r) (3.8)
where 3 is the Lagrangian rest corresponding to the utility from mo-
ments with order greater than 2. From this we obtain the certainty
equivalent due to each moment:
CE(1) = f(1  )U(r)g
1
1    1 (3.9)
CE(2) =

(1  )[U(r) + 1
2
U 00(r)E(r   r)2]
 1
1 
 CE(1) 1 (3.10)
CE(i>2) = CE(r)  CE(1)  CE(2) (3.11)
We compute the certainty equivalent from annual overlapping re-
turns, an adequate horizon from an investor perspective. Also, one-year
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horizons capture better the occasional large drawdowns of momentum
documented in Section 3.2.
Table 3.4 shows the decomposition of the certainty equivalent for
the representative investor holding the market portfolio. It also assesses
whether it is optimal to deviate from the market portfolio to include
(risk-managed) momentum.
The rst row shows the results for holding only the market portfolio.
The mean return had a positive contribution for the certainty equivalent
of 11.72 percent per year, but the variance of returns reduces this by
7.39 p.p. Higher order moments diminish the certainty equivalent by
a further 4.18 p.p. As a result the certainty equivalent of the market
portfolio was only 0.14 percent per year.
Adding momentum to the market portfolio increases returns. As a
result the certainty equivalent of the mean return increases from 11.72
percent per year to 28.51 percent. The higher standard deviation par-
tially o¤sets this gain by reducing the certainty equivalent by 6.51 p.p.
Still, looking only at the rst two moments of the combined portfolio
leads to the conclusion that the investor is better o¤ including momen-
tum.
But the increase in higher order risk  the momentum crashes 
reduces the certainty equivalent by 15.89 p.p. per year. As a result, in-
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cluding momentum actually dampens the economic performance of the
market portfolio. The certainty equivalent of the market plus momen-
tum is -5.46 percent per year versus 0.14 percent of the market only.
The high Sharpe ratio of momentum does not compensate the investor
for bearing the increased crash risk. So, in spite of the impressive cu-
mulative returns of momentum in the long-run, crash risk is so high
that a reasonable risk-averse investor would rather just hold the market
portfolio.
This illustrates with an economic measure how far the distribution
of momentum is from normality. Indeed, momentum has a distribution
with many small gains and few, but extreme, large losses. Taking this
into account the momentum puzzle of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is
substantially diminished. Our discussion in terms of utility shows that
rare observations with large losses are signicant enough to change the
interest of momentum for a risk-averse investor holding the market.
In contrast, risk-managed momentum produces large economic gains.
These come from higher returns when compared to the market (a 19.92
p.p. gain) and less crash risk than the market with plain momentum
(a 14.96 p.p. gain). As a result, the annual certainty equivalent of the
market with risk-managed momentum is 13.54 percent, which compares
very favorably to the 0.14 percent of the market alone and even more so
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with the -5.46 percent of the market combined with simple momentum.
Comparing the strategies with plain and scaled momentum, risk
management produces a 3.13 p.p. gain in returns and a 15.86 p.p. gain
from reduction of risk. So the bulk of the gains comes from less risk, es-
pecially high-order moments. Essentially, scaling momentum eliminates
non-normal risk without sacricing returns.
3.6 Anatomy of momentum risk
A well documented result in the momentum literature is that momentum
has time-varying market risk (Grundy and Martin (2001)). This is an
intuitive nding since after bear markets winners tend to be low-beta
stocks and the inverse for losers. But Daniel and Moskowitz (2011) show
that using betas to hedge risk in real time does not work. This contrasts
with our nding that the risk of momentum is highly predictable and
managing it o¤ers strong gains. Why is scaling with forecasted variances
so di¤erent from hedging with market betas? We show it is because time-
varying betas are not the main source of predictability in momentum
risk.
We use a CAPM regression to decompose the risk of momentum into
systematic and specic risk:
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RVwml;t = 
2
tRVrmrf;t + 
2
e;t (3.12)
The realized variances and betas are estimated with 6-months of
daily returns. On average, the systematic component 2tRVrmrf;t accounts
for only 23 percent of the total risk of momentum. Almost 80 percent
of the momentum risk is specic. Also, the di¤erent components do not
have the same predictability. Table 3.5 shows the results of an AR (1)
on each component of risk.
Either in-sample or out-of-sample (OOS), 2t is the least predictable
component of momentum risk. Its OOS R-square is only 5 percent.
The realized variance of the market also has a small OOS R-square of 7
percent. When combined, both elements of systematic risk component
already show more predictability (OOS R-square of 21 percent) but still
less than the realized variance of momentum (OOS R-square of 44 per-
cent). The most predictable component of momentum variance is the
specic risk with an OOS R-square of 47 percent, more than double the
predictability of the systematic risk.
Hedging with betas alone, as in Daniel and Moskowitz (2011) fails
because most of the risk is left out.
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3.7 Conclusion
Unconditional momentum has a distribution that is far from normal,
with huge crash risk. We nd that taking this crash risk into consider-
ation, momentum is not appealing for a risk-averse investor.
Yet, the risk of momentum is highly predictable. Managing this
risk eliminates exposure to crashes and increases the Sharpe ratio of the
strategy substantially.
As a result, the momentum puzzle shows up stronger in its risk-
managed version and the case for a peso explanation of momentum re-
turns is severely weakened.
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3.8 Annex: Data sources
We obtain daily and monthly returns for the market portfolio, the high-
minus-low, the small-minus-big, the ten momentum-sorted portfolios
and the risk-free (one-month Treasury-bill return) from Kenneth Frenchs
data library. The monthly data is from July 1926 to December 2011 and
the daily data is from July 1963 to December 2011.
For the period from July 1926 to June 1963, we use daily excess
returns on the market portfolio (the value-weighted return of all rms
on NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq) from the Center for Research in Secu-
rity Prices (CRSP). We also have daily returns for ten value-weighted
portfolios sorted on previous momentum from Daniel and Moskowitz
(2011). This allows us to work with a long sample of daily returns for
the winner-minus-losers (WML) strategy from August 1926 to Decem-
ber 2011. We use these daily returns to calculate the realized variances
in the previous 21, 63 and 126 sessions at the end of each month.
For the momentum portfolios, all stocks in the NYSE, AMEX and
Nasdaq universe are ranked according to returns from month t-12 to
t-2, then classied into deciles according to NYSE cuto¤s. So there
is an equal number of NYSE rms in each bin. The WML strategy
consists on shorting the lowest (loser) decile and a long position in the
highest (winner) decile. Individual rms are value weighted in each
100
decile. Following the convention in the literature, the formation period
for month t excludes the returns in the preceding month. See Daniel
and Moskowitz (2011) for a more detailed description of how they build
momentum portfolios. The procedures (and results) are very similar to
those of the Fama-French momentum portfolios for the 1963:07-2011:12
sample.
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Max Min Mean STD KURT SKEW SR
RMRF 38.27 -29.04 7.33 18.96 7.35 0.17 0.39
SMB 39.04 -16.62 2.99 11.52 21.99 2.17 0.26
HML 35.48 -13.45 4.50 12.38 15.63 1.84 0.36
WML 26.18 -78.96 14.46 27.53 18.24 -2.47 0.53
Table 3.1: The long-run performance of momentum compared to the
Fama-French factors. KURTstands for excess kurtosis and SR for
Sharpe ratio. The sample returns are from 1927:03 to 2011:12.
 t-stat  t-stat R2 OOS R2  
Panel A: 1927:03 to 2011:12
RMRF 0.0010 6.86 0.60 23.92 36.03 38.81 12.81 7.82
WML 0.0012 5.21 0.70 31.31 49.10 57.82 15.03 12.26
Panel B: 1963:07 to 2011:12
RMRF 0.0009 5.65 0.58 17.10 33.55 25.46 13.76 8.48
SMB 0.0004 8.01 0.33 8.32 10.68 -8.41 7.36 3.87
HML 0.0001 4.88 0.73 25.84 53.55 53.37 6.68 4.29
WML 0.0009 3.00 0.77 29.29 59.71 55.26 16.40 13.77
Table 3.2: AR (1) of 1-month realized variances. The realized variances
are the sum of squared daily returns in each month. The AR (1) regresses
each realized variance on its lag and a constant. The OOS R-squared
uses the rst 240 months to run an initial regression so producing an
OOS forecast. Then uses an expanding window of observations till the
end of the sample. In panel A the sample period is from 1927:03 to
2011:12. In panel B we repeat the regressions for RMRF and WML and
add the same information for the HML and SMB. The last two columns
show, respectively, the average realized volatility and its standard devi-
ation.
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Max Min Mean STD KURT SKEW SR
WML 26.18 -78.96 14.46 27.53 18.24 -2.47 0.53
WML 21.95 -28.40 16.50 16.95 2.68 -0.42 0.97
Table 3.3: Momentum and the economic gains from scaling. The rst
row presents as a benchmark the economic performance of plain momen-
tum from 1927:03 to 2011:12. The second row presents the performance
of risk-managed momentum. The risk-managed momentum uses the
realized variance in the previous 6 months.
CE(1) CE(2) CE(i>2) CE(r)
RM 11.72 -7.39 -4.18 0.14
RM+WML 28.51 -13.90 -20.07 -5.46
RM+WML* 31.64 -13.00 -5.11 13.54
Table 3.4: The economic performance of momentum for a representative
investor. The rst row shows the performance of the market portfolio.
The second row combines the market portfolio with momentum and the
third one with scaled momentum. The rst column shows the certainty
equivalent of the mean return of each strategy. The second and third
columns present the contribution to the certainty equivalent of standard
deviation and higher moments, respectively. The last column shows the
certainty equivalent obtained from annual non-overlapping returns. The
returns are from 1927:03 to 2011:12. The decomposition uses a Taylor
expansion of the utility function around the mean return of the portfolio
with a CRRA of 4.
 t-stat  t-stat R2 R2OOS
2wml 0.0012 2.59 0.70 12.58 0.49 0.44
2rmrf 0.0012 4.29 0.50 7.37 0.25 0.07
2 0.3544 6.05 0.21 2.83 0.05 0.05
22rmrf 0.0007 2.73 0.47 6.80 0.22 0.21
2" 0.0007 2.69 0.72 13.51 0.52 0.47
Table 3.5: Risk decomposition of momentum risk. Each row shows the
results of an AR (1) for 3-month, non-overlapping periods. The rst row
is for the realized variance of the WML and the second one the realized
variance of the market. The third row is squared beta, estimated as a
simple regression of 63 daily returns of the WML on RMRF. The fourth
row is the systematic component of momentum risk and the last row the
specic component. The OOS R-squares use an expanding window of
observations after an initial in-sample period of 20 years.
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Figure 3.1: The long-run cumulative returns of momentum compared to
the Fama-French factors. Each strategy consists on investing $1 at the
beginning of the sample in the risk-free rate and combine it with the
respective long-short portfolio. The proceeds are fully reinvested till the
end of the sample. On the right is the terminal value of each strategy.
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Figure 3.2: Momentum crashes. The gure plots the cumulative return
and terminal value of the momentum and market portfolio strategies in
its two most turbulent periods: the 1930s and the 2000s.
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Figure 3.3: The long-run performance of risk-managed momentum. The
risk-managed momentum (WML*) scales the exposure to momentum
using the realized variance in the previous 6-months. In the beginning
of the sample the strategy invests $1 in the risk-free asset and combines
it with the long-short portfolio. The proceeds are fully reinvested till
the end of the sample. On the right is the terminal value of the strategy.
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Figure 3.4: The realized volatility of momentum obtained from daily
returns in each month from 1927:03 to 2011:12.
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Figure 3.5: The density of plain momentum (WML) and risk-managed
momentum (WML*). The risk-managed momentum uses the realized
variance in the previous 6 months to scale the exposure to momentum.
The returns are from 1927:03 to 2011:12.
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Figure 3.6: The benets of risk-management in the 1930s and the 00s.
The risk-managed momentum (WML*) uses the realized variance in the
previous 6 months to scale the exposure to momentum.
109
30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
The weights of the strategy: 1927:03-2011:12
w
ei
gh
t o
n 
W
M
L
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